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Reflections on Patrick Baert’s 
The Existentialist Moment: 
The Rise of Sartre as a Public Intellectual 
 
Simon Susen 
 
 
Abstract In this chapter, Simon Susen provides an in-depth review of 
Patrick Baert’s The Existentialist Moment: The Rise of Sartre as a Public 
Intellectual (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), focusing on the theoretical 
dimensions underpinning the analysis developed in this book. The chap- 
ter is divided into two parts. In the first part, Susen gives a detailed, and 
largely sympathetic, overview of Baert’s approach, drawing attention to 
its main conceptual and methodological contributions to the sociological 
study of intellectuals. In the second part, Susen grapples with the limita- 
tions and shortcomings of Baert’s approach, especially with respect to its 
plea for a paradigm shift from a ‘vocabulary of intentions’ to a ‘vocabu- 
lary of effects’ in the sociology of intellectuals. The chapter concludes 
with a brief reflection on the role that intellectuals may play in shaping 
the development of society. 
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 Patrick Baert’s The Existentialist Moment: The Rise of Sartre as a Public 
Intellectual1 can be regarded as a highly original, and also much-needed, 
contribution to contemporary sociological thought. It provides an unprece- 
dented account of the socio-historical conditions permitting Jean-Paul Sartre 
to become one of the most influential public intellectuals in modern history. 
The book is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 explores the 
extraordinary historical constellations that emerged within ‘the unusual 
context of the occupation of France, from mid-1940 until mid-1944’2, 
illustrating the extent to which it impacted upon the cultural field and 
intensified ‘already existing divisions within the intellectual community’3. 
Chapter 2 examines ‘the purge of French collaborationist intellectuals’4, 
notably in the period 1944–1945, focusing on the politico-ideological 
controversies sparked by the prosecutions of those accused of collabora- 
tion with the Nazis. Chapter 3 sheds light on ‘the intellectual shifts that 
took place in France’5 as a result of the purge, paying particular atten- 
tion to Sartre’s journalistic interventions published between 1944 and 
1945. Chapter 4 grapples with ‘the sudden rise of existentialism in the 
autumn of 1945’6, to which Simone de Beauvoir famously referred as   
the ‘existentialist offensive’7. Chapter 5 aims to explain how Sartre suc- 
ceeded in establishing himself as ‘a committed intellectual’8 between 
1946 and 1947. Chapter 6 offers ‘a multi-levelled account for the rise of 
Sartre’9, in addition to scrutinizing the main reasons behind the gradual 
decline of existentialism in French intellectual life ‘from the early 1960s 
onwards’10. Chapter 7 elucidates the theoretical  framework  underly-  
ing this study, sketching out and  defending  ‘a  performative  perspec- 
tive for conceptualizing intellectual interventions’11, developments, and 
transformations. It is the purpose of the following sections to discuss, 
above all, the theoretical dimensions underpinning Baert’s analysis in The 
Existentialist Moment. 
 
 
FIRST PART: BAERT’S ARGUMENT 
 
I. Sartre: Public Intellectual and Public Celebrity 
 
As his fiercest critics will be forced to concede, ‘Jean-Paul Sartre achieved 
an astonishingly high public profile during his heyday’12, which some 
commentators may characterize as ‘unrivalled’13 in terms of the media 
attention he received as well as the wider political influence he enjoyed 
both in France and in other ‘Western’ countries. Baert’s book is a
 conceptually sophisticated, methodologically rigorous, and empirically 
substantiated attempt to grasp the multiple factors leading to the emer- 
gence of ‘this extraordinary case of public celebrity’14. One of the fas- 
cinating aspects of this case is that it was in a remarkably brief timespan 
that Sartre managed to rise ‘from relative obscurity to public promi- 
nence’15, occupying a central place in the political and philosophical 
imagination of intellectuals, initially in France and eventually across the 
world. 
Baert wishes to challenge the commonly held assumption that the rise 
of both Sartre in particular and existentialism in general are intimately 
interrelated with the political turbulence of the late 1960s. Contrary to 
this supposition, he makes a strong case for the view that, in the afore- 
mentioned period, the status, credibility, and influence of Sartre’s philos- 
ophy were already in decline. In fact, upon closer inspection, it becomes 
clear that it was between 1944 and 1947—‘especially in the autumn of 
1945’16—that Sartre gained an exceptional amount of public promi- 
nence. Before then, his writings—including his masterpiece L’être et le 
néant [Being and Nothingness]17—were hardly known beyond a special- 
ist circle of expert philosophers. It should take Sartre barely more than 
three years, however, to convert himself into a high-profile figure on the 
international scene of intellectual discourse. 
Throughout his study, Baert aims to respond to two fundamental 
questions. The first question concerns the historical context in which 
Sartre and his philosophical movement gained popularity: why did the 
rise of Sartrean existentialism occur between 1944 and 1947,  rather 
than before or after this period? The second question relates to the role 
that the intellectual specificity of Sartre and his philosophical movement 
played in contributing to their sudden and extensive popularity: why did 
Sartrean existentialism become highly influential on a global intellectual 
stage, despite the somewhat opaque and impenetrable nature of its key 
scholarly outputs, which were inspired by the writings of the German 
philosopher Martin Heidegger, whose complicity with and involvement 
in the Nazi regime were a well-known fact?18 
Seeking to address these questions, Baert points out that two chief 
factors deserve particular attention. First, ‘between 1940 and 1945, 
French intellectuals became involved in intense power struggles in which 
those seen to be associated with the Resistance were ultimately victori- 
ous’19. In this context, ‘the purge (épuration) of collaborationist intel- 
lectuals’20 gained prominence in the shared effort to create a progressive
 political climate in France. Second, during and after its occupation by   
the Nazis, France went through a national cultural trauma, that is, ‘a 
widespread sense that certain events—in this case, Vichy and the occu- 
pation—caused collective distress and irredeemable damage, potentially 
threatening the social fabric of society’21. In this respect, the challenge, 
faced not only by intellectuals but also by ordinary citizens, consisted in 
grappling with and contributing to ‘the remaking of French nationhood’22 
within a historical period that was still overshadowed by individual and 
collective attempts to come to terms with ‘the trauma of the war’23. 
 
 
II. Two Scholarly ‘Explanations’:  
Bourdieu and Collins 
 
As Baert spells out, despite there being ‘a wide body of academic lit- 
erature on existentialism’24, there is little in the way of a systematic, let 
alone conclusive, commentary ‘on why existentialism gained such promi- 
nence when it did’25. The two only noteworthy exceptions in the socio- 
logical literature are Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory and Randall Collins’s 
network approach. Given their relevance in relation to the thematic focus 
of this book, it is worth considering them in some detail. 
1. 
Bourdieu’s field-theoretic framework lies at the heart of Anna 
Boschetti’s Sartre et « Les Temps Modernes ». Une entreprise intellectuelle 
[The Intellectual Enterprise. Sartre and ‘Les Temps Modernes’]26. As high- 
lighted in Bourdieu’s writings on socially stratified forms of cultural pro- 
duction27, one of the most distinctive features of the cultural field in 
modern France is that it is ‘exceptionally unified, centralized and hierar- 
chical’28, marked by ‘a fierce struggle over symbolic recognition’29. In the 
cultural field, just as in other social fields, different agents are equipped 
with different types and volumes of capital and, thus, with different forms 
and amounts of material and symbolic resources, enabling them to compete 
with one another within a vertically structured realm of objectively exter- 
nalized positions and subjectively internalized dispositions.30 The historical 
specificity of the French cultural arena in the nineteenth century was due 
to its internal division between the literary world and the academic world, 
which may be conceived of as two different fields, ‘each with its own 
logic’31. In fact, ‘[i]t is only in the course of the twentieth century that the 
two fields started to intersect, and few people managed to combine the
 requirements to excel in both fields’32. Sartre was one of the few intellec- 
tual figures who succeeded in deciphering, and benefiting from, the codes 
of accomplishment within these two domains, putting him in an excep- 
tionally strong position to occupy a triumphant—and, ultimately, hegem- 
onic—place in the French intellectual field in the mid-1940s. 
It appears, then, that it was, to a large extent, due to Sartre’s ‘ability   
to stand out in those two genres’33—which he used ‘as complementary 
channels’34 for the circulation of his ideas, claims,  and  convictions—  
that he could embrace the opportunity to establish himself as one of the 
most influential European intellectuals of all time. Owing to his capac-   
ity to immerse himself and to function within different realms of high 
culture, he managed to overcome the ‘sharp division between novelists 
and professors’35: the former tended to be self-funded, emerging from 
relatively privileged backgrounds; the latter tended to pass through the 
elitist channels of the École normale superieure. Sartre mastered—to use 
a Bourdieusian metaphor—‘the rules of the game’36 within both spheres 
of cultural expression. Indeed, ‘journalism would allow him to add 
another string to his bow’37 of manifold scholarly engagements, convert- 
ing him into the epitome of the ‘total intellectual’38. 
Undoubtedly, Sartre was able to count with the logistical, emotional, 
and ideological support of leading intellectuals ‘occupying editorial posi- 
tions in literary journals and in newspapers’39 and, hence, ensuring the 
largely favourable reception of his work in influential circles. The deci- 
sive function of this professional network of sympathetic peers was illus- 
trated—perhaps, most significantly—in the formative role of the journal 
Les Temps Modernes, founded in 1945, which turned out to serve as ‘a 
hegemonic power base’40 of discursive influence for Sartre and his fol- 
lowers for many years to come. 
One of the strongest points of Boschetti’s analysis lies in its capac-     
ity to shed light on ‘the inner logic of the French field of intellectual 
production’41, notably in terms of its reliance on ‘distinctive elite insti- 
tutions’42 sufficiently powerful to advance Sartre’s ‘career and public 
profile’43 in France, thereby paving the way for his successive influence 
on a global scale. One of the weakest points of her approach, however,    
is its ‘tendency to treat the intellectual sphere as a relatively autono- 
mous unity’44, thereby overlooking the wider socio-political conditions 
impacting upon the development of the intellectual field. From such a 
narrow perspective, it is difficult ‘to explain why the rise of Sartre and
 existentialism occurred during this particular period—not before, not 
after’45. Just as it would be erroneous to reduce a paradigmatic rise to      
a field-specific logic, it would be mistaken to account for it in terms of     
an ‘individualistic logic’46, which is motivated by the personality-focused 
conviction that it was mainly Sartre’s ‘unique and multiple qualities’47, 
including ‘his genius or unrivalled charisma’48, that equipped him with    
a decisive competitive advantage over his peers in the French intellec- 
tual field in the mid-twentieth century. Although, according to Baert, 
Boschetti’s inquiry succeeds in elucidating both the ideological trends 
and the ‘broader societal developments that impinged on the cultural 
sphere’49 in mid-twentieth century France, it fails to take into consid- 
eration ‘the specific conditions at the end of the war and their dramatic 
repercussions for the intellectual field’50, particularly with regard to their 
power to favour the rise of some philosophical currents, while obstruct- 
ing the consolidation of others. 
2. 
Randall  Collins’s  network  approach  is  forcefully   articulated  in his 
ground-breaking The Sociology of Philosophies. A Global Theory of 
Intellectual Change51. As indicated in the  title,  this  study  is  motivated 
by the ambitious venture to provide ‘a general theory of intellectual 
change’52, highlighting the structural and ideological transformations 
that have taken place within the prestigious discipline of philosophy 
over the past three centuries at an international level. Given his 
emphasis on the macro-social embeddedness of all cultural—including 
intellectual—developments, Collins is suspicious of non-sociological—
that is, idealistic, personalistic, and individualistic— interpretations of 
the production of symbolic forms. Rather than conceiving of culture as 
‘autonomous of society’53, as if it were  reducible to a self-sufficient 
force of an untouchable superstructure, and instead of endeavouring to 
write ‘the type of intellectual history that attempts to show, through a 
detailed investigation of arguments and counterarguments, how one set 
of ideas brings about another’54, Collins proposes to explore the social 
conditions  of  production  in  which symbolically mediated actions take 
place. On this view, it is misleading to endorse an ‘intellectual history 
that glorifies the individual and his or her creative output’55, to the 
degree that such a personality-focused approach fails to account for the 
sociological variables that shape human practices. 
 According to Collins’s ‘general theory of interaction rituals’56 (or—      
if one prefers—his ‘wider theory of interaction ritual chains’57), two 
concepts are crucial for the sociological analysis of the intellectual field: 
(a) emotional energy and (b) cultural capital. The former constitutes ‘a 
motivating force’58 by which imaginative entities are driven when con- 
verting the symbolic goods that they produce into meaning-bearing 
vehicles of self-realization. The latter ‘helps to direct creative output 
effectively’59, equipping purposive beings with the collectively transmit- 
ted and individually assimilated resources that need to be mobilized in 
the pursuit of social recognition. The belief in intellectual originality 
strikes a chord with those obsessed with the construction of culturally 
codified—and, hence, not universally accessible—currencies. On this 
account, it is both an ontological delusion and a methodological error    
‘to conceive of ideas as rooted in individuals or individual minds’60, since 
they are ‘anchored in networks and motivated to a considerable extent by 
rivalries between individuals and between groups of individuals’61. 
To be sure, for Collins, the creation and reproduction of academic 
networks are far from arbitrary. According to the ‘law of small num- 
bers’62, ‘only three to six successful creative schools can exist at one 
time’63: less than three are highly improbable, owing to the  dynamic  
and  competitive  constitution  of  the   intellectual   field;   more   than   
six are hardly viable, due to ‘the survival of the fittest’  logic  perme- 
ating the evolution of the intellectual field. In other words, some 
intellectual schools survive, whereas others will  be  extinguished.  In  
the chapter ‘Writers’ Markets and Academic Networks: The French 
Connection’64, Collins examines the development and influence of 
existentialism, which he regards as an intellectual current that has 
reached the paradigmatic status of belonging to the circle of ‘one  of 
those competitive creative schools’65. Scrutinizing the personal, insti- 
tutional, and cultural connections  between  influential  French  schol-  
ars (such as Simone de Beauvoir, Paul Nizan, Georges Canguilhem, 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty,  Raymond  Aron,  and  Jean-Paul  Sartre),  Collins 
draws attention to the vital role of social networks in deter- mining the 
effectiveness of both emotional energy and cultural capital, when 
scholars—as emerging or established figures—seek to position 
themselves within a ‘highly selective, competitive and hierarchical’66 
field of intellectuals. In this respect, it is striking that a largely French 
network of existentialists,  such  as  Sartre  and  his  followers,  arose   
out of a German network of phenomenologists, such as Edmund
 Husserl and Martin Heidegger. It would be inaccurate, however, to 
overlook the fact that existentialism was also profoundly shaped by 
Francophone scholars, such as Alexandre Koyré and Alexandre Kojève, 
whose philosophical projects were based upon central ideas developed 
in Germanophone circles of intellectual thought.67 
In addition to benefiting from an exceptionally high amount of cul- 
tural capital (derived from his privileged access to valuable social, educa- 
tional, linguistic, and symbolic resources), Sartre took advantage of his 
close connections with the publisher Gallimard, which became a ‘net- 
work centre’68 for up-and-coming French intellectuals, permitting them 
to distribute their works in the form of affordable paperback editions, 
which suited hybridized approaches such as existentialism, whose intellec- 
tual outlook cut across the disciplinary boundaries separating literature 
and philosophy.69 
One of the strongest points of Collins’s analysis is its capacity to 
account for the confluence of multiple factors in the emergence of intel- 
lectual fields. Social networks are contingent upon the connections 
established between polycentrically positioned agents, whose embod- 
ied practices are performed in multidimensionally structured—and, on 
numerous levels, overlapping—realms of action and interaction: private 
and public, personal and professional, ephemeral and institutional, cul- 
tural and political, ideological and logistical, material and  symbolic.70 
One of the weakest points of his approach, however, is reflected in its 
incapacity to flesh out the specificity of the existentialist movement— 
notably, in terms of its competitive advantages over rival philosophical 
currents, which could have exploited (or, in some cases, did exploit) the 
various transformations taking place in the intellectual field to a similar 
extent, but which did not enjoy the same degree of success in the mid- 
1940s, at least not in France. This explanatory deficit is reinforced by   
the erroneous tendency to treat the intellectual field as ‘relatively auton- 
omous from other societal developments’71, thereby shifting the ana- 
lytical focus away from macro-historical trends to  ‘the  inner  struggle 
for attention in the  intellectual  space’72.  This  methodological strategy 
is barely appropriate, however, for ‘explaining why, at a particular point, 
some intellectuals, and indeed some intellectual currents, have a broader 
appeal’73 than others. Thus, Collins’s framework falls short of providing 
satisfying answers to fundamental questions such as ‘Why Sartre?’, ‘Why 
existentialism?’, and ‘Why both Sartre and existentialism in the mid- 
1940s?’. In response to these matters, Baert affirms that it is crucial to
 take ‘the broader cultural climate of the mid-1940s’74 into consideration. 
The question of why some intellectual scholars and schools are successful 
(and others are not) is, as we shall see, essential to understanding both 
the constitution and the evolution of knowledge production in modern 
societies. 
 
 
III. Four Alternative ‘Explanations’ 
 
With the exception of Boschetti’s and Collins’s respective accounts, as 
well as Ingrid Galster’s edited collection La naissance du phénomène 
Sartre. Raisons d’un succès, 1938–194575, one finds little in the way of 
sociological research attempting to explain the rise of Sartre and existen- 
tialism in the contemporary literature. Unsurprisingly, there are numer- 
ous secondary sources on Sartre, formulating a variety of hypotheses 
concerning his achievements and success as a major public intellectual.76 
As Baert spells out, four perspectives are particularly influential in this 
regard. 
First, one may seek to explain Sartre’s success in terms of his ‘indi- 
vidual qualities’77. On this view, ‘his intellect, his charisma, charm, 
adaptability, opportunism or simply his determination, ambition and 
work ethic’78 were so outstanding that—irrespective of the social circum- 
stances that might have benefitted his rise—Sartre (the person) was fated 
to become ‘Sartre’ (the label). This narrative implies that he managed to 
enter the kingdom of classics in philosophy owing to the perfect com- 
bination of ‘natural aptitude and hard work’79. Undoubtedly, Sartre’s 
talents and industry played a vital role in his success story. Given that 
many other intellectuals were equipped with these attributes, however, it 
is problematic to consider them in isolation from other factors. 
Second, one may wish to explain Sartre’s success in terms of ‘the 
autumn of 1945’80, also known as ‘the “existentialist offensive” ’ 81.  On  
this interpretation, Sartre’s public lecture L’existentialisme est un human- 
isme82, delivered on 29th October 1945, played a pivotal role in grant- 
ing Sartre ‘celebrity status’83—initially in France and eventually across 
the world. The main shortcoming of this reading, however, is that, while 
remaining largely ‘descriptive’84, it tends to disregard ‘the broader his- 
torical context’85 in which the rise of Sartre and existentialism occurred. 
To the extent that historical analysis focuses on a snapshot taken in rela- 
tion to the autumn of 1945, it  fails  to  account  for  the  importance of 
the developments that took place in preceding, as well as in succeeding,
 years—not only in France, but also in other ‘Western’ countries. 
Collective efforts to come to terms with the multiple traumatic experi- 
ences of the Second World  War—which, in the French case, amounted   
to a curious mixture of conflicting sentiments such as ‘guilt, pride and 
shame’86—posed a tangible challenge to the intellectual landscape on all 
sides of the political spectrum. A snapshot view, however, falls short of 
doing justice to the complexity of diverse—and, at several levels, inter- 
related—historical dynamics. 
Third, one may elect to explain Sartre’s success in terms of ‘the relax- 
ing of morals’87 as a collectively desired ‘antidote to the repressive years 
of Vichy’88. On this understanding, Sartre—not least because  of  his  
fierce opposition to the Vichy regime—epitomized the values, principles, 
and practices of those supporting the Résistance against the conserva- 
tive values of the morally oppressive and politically opportunistic sectors 
of French society. This interpretation is problematic, however, to the 
degree that it is based on the misleading assumption that existentialism, 
due to its alleged emphasis on the radical freedom pervading the course 
of human agency, ‘hardly imposed any burden on the individual’89, and 
even less so on the collective conscience of society. Yet, as Baert remarks, 
‘[t]o suggest that Sartre’s existentialism was experienced  as  a licence 
for unbridled freedom ignores his strong moral vocabulary at the time 
and the centrality of the notion of responsibility’90. Contrary to com- 
mon misconceptions, our freedom to make choices means that we—as 
rational subjects capable of morally guided behaviour—are responsible for 
our actions. Hence, far from making a case for the relaxation, let alone 
the rejection, of morals, Sartre’s existentialist philosophy is a systematic 
attempt to demonstrate that human beings are accountable for their 
decisions and actions. 
Fourth, one may prefer to explain Sartre’s success in terms of ‘the 
power of generational shifts’91. The underlying supposition of this stance 
is the—seemingly plausible—notion that different generations experience 
particular socio-political events and trends in a variety of forms. On this 
perspective, ‘shared experiences’92 generate ‘similar sensitivities’93—that 
is, a sort of common habitus of a Schicksalsgemeinschaft, which may be 
defined as a group of individuals united by the collective experience of 
the same, or a similar, fate. Surely, the use of the word ‘generation’ as an 
‘explanatory concept’94 appears useful, in the sense that it permits us to 
account for the dispositional formation of ‘likes and dislikes’95 in terms  
of one of the most powerful stratifying variables of social structure: age.
 Yet, the ways in which individuals relate to, make sense of, and act upon 
the world is shaped by multiple sociological variables—such as class, eth- 
nicity, gender, ‘ability’, and age.96 Thus, ‘the notion of generation is too 
blunt an instrument to capture the complex relationship between experi- 
ence and intellectual sensitivities’97, especially to the extent that it fails  
to unearth the intersectional constitution of the  human  immersion  in 
the world, which is irreducible to the preponderance of one sociological 
determinant. To  be clear, this is not to deny the significance, let alone  
the existence, of generational shifts; this is to recognize, however, that    
it would be reductive to portray the rise of Sartre and existentialism as a 
mere expression of a mood change, expressed in the emergence of a new 
‘collective psyche’98 in post-war France. 
The point, then, is to accept that, while the aforementioned consider- 
ations capture significant aspects of a complex constellation of conditions 
and circumstances, the analysis of the combination of these elements, 
rather than of their ostensibly isolated role, is necessary for a comprehen- 
sive understanding of the key factors that contributed to the rise of Sartre 
and existentialism. 
 
 
IV. Baert’s Theoretical Orientation 
 
Baert proposes to distinguish between intellectuals and critics. The for- 
mer concept refers to creative individuals who ‘tend to produce relatively 
innovative intellectual goods, like plays, novels or philosophical trea- 
tises’99. The latter concept designates discursively equipped agents who 
‘tend to paraphrase and [to] comment on those products in journals or 
newspapers with a relatively wide circulation’100. Far from being reduc- 
ible to merely passive or reactive analysts or pundits, critics can take on 
the powerful ‘role of gatekeeper[s]’101, capable of either facilitating or 
obstructing the distribution of intellectual contributions, depending on 
whether they are sympathetically disposed towards or negatively preju- 
diced against them. 
It would be misleading to associate intellectuals with the realm of 
imaginative transcendence and critics with the realm of mind-numbing 
immanence, as if they constituted two entirely separate groups of peo- 
ple with diametrically opposed tasks and interests. Instead, it is crucial to 
recognize that—while they fulfil complementary functions—the distinc- 
tion between them is, in practice, somewhat blurred. Indeed, although 
Sartre and his followers acted, above all, as intellectuals, they frequently
 adopted the role of critics, especially when commenting on each other’s 
contentions and contributions. This tacit role switch works both ways: 
critics sporadically generate intellectual outputs for which they claim full 
and legitimate authorship, just as intellectuals regularly comment on the 
writings of fellow intellectuals—notably in magazines, journals, books, 
and serials, but also in public debates, lectures, workshops, and confer- 
ences.102 
Furthermore, Baert proposes to distinguish between intra-intellectual 
arena and public intellectual arena. The former concept describes a rela- 
tionally constructed sphere in which ‘professional intellectuals address 
mainly other professional intellectuals’103. As such, it delineates a dis- 
cursive domain that is, to a large degree, ‘governed by the intellectuals 
themselves’104. The latter concept, by contrast, designates a relatively 
open realm of exchanges of opinion requiring ‘a degree of validation by 
the “consumers” of knowledge as well as the producers’105. By defini- 
tion, public intellectuals seek to reach a broad audience of both experts 
and laypersons; the success of their ‘output[s] is determined not solely 
by intellectuals, but also by the media—professional journalists and com- 
mentators—and publishers’106. Consequently, they depend on mecha- 
nisms of approval, recognition, appreciation, and legitimation, whose 
underlying ideological and logistical parameters lie not only outside their 
comfort zone but also, to a significant degree, beyond their control. 
In  relation  to  the  previous  distinction,   Baert   offers   the  following 
points of clarification: 
 
1. ‘The self-regulatory principle of the intra-intellectual world is epit- 
omised by the Humboldtian notion of the university according to 
which the academic world is largely managed by the academic pro- 
ducers themselves’107. From this perspective, academic life needs to 
assert a healthy degree of autonomy in order to avoid being partly 
or totally absorbed and colonized by the systemic imperatives of 
market-driven and state-administered societies.108 To be sure, both 
the commodification and the bureaucratization of almost every 
interactional sphere in highly differentiated societies tend to under- 
mine the emancipatory resources inherent in the human quest for 
individual and collective forms of self-realization based on auton- 
omy and sovereignty. In practice, ‘increasing government interfer- 
ence, a rising audit culture and budget cuts have meant the gradual 
erosion of the Humboldtian vision’109, reinforcing the suspicion of
 the systemic colonization of people’s lifeworlds110, including those 
spheres—such as the intellectual, scientific, artistic, and academic 
fields—which are bastions of human freedom, imagination, and 
creativity. One of the remarkable facts about Sartre is that—despite 
the precious cultural, educational, and intellectual capital that he 
obtained as a student within the academic field and notwithstand- 
ing the massive influence that he had upon the development of the 
academic field—he ‘never held an academic position’111. One may 
speculate whether it was because of or in spite of Sartre’s ‘academic 
non-academic profile’ that he did not succeed in reaching ‘a wider 
public until the end of the war’112. What is clear, however, is that  
he eventually established himself as one of the most prominent 
public intellectuals in the history of ‘Western’ civilization. 
2. Baert’s distinction between intra-intellectual arena and public 
intellectual arena displays a striking resemblance to Bourdieu’s 
conceptual differentiation between ‘the field of restricted cultural 
production’ and ‘the field of generalized cultural production’.113 
Within the former, ‘producers address other producers and defy an 
economic logic’114. In this sphere, what is produced is, to a large 
extent, aimed at producers themselves and, hence, at those who 
find themselves in the privileged position of being able to make 
sense of the normative parameters that are projected upon symbol- 
ically codified creations by an exclusivist group of specialists and 
gatekeepers. Within the latter, ‘producers address a broader public 
and embrace a business model’115. In this sphere, what is produced 
is, to a large degree, aimed at non-producers and, thus, at  those 
who belong to the wider community of ordinary people, who are, 
above all, destined to consume cultural goods whose enjoyment— 
because it defies complexity—is not hindered by protectionist 
codes of snobbish elitism. 
3. The intra-intellectual arena has been ‘the subject of extensive 
sociological analyses’116, to a larger extent than the public intel- 
lectual arena. This far-reaching  sociological  interest  in  spheres  
of scholarly productions and exchanges is, to a considerable 
degree, due to the fact that intellectuals have a tendency to be 
obsessed with themselves, thereby breeding the kind of collective 
narcissism that is needed to make themselves believe that their 
behavioural and ideological modes of functioning are cognitively,
 morally, and aesthetically superior to those produced and repro- 
duced by ordinary human beings. The ‘broader underlying ques- 
tion’117, however, is ‘under which conditions ideas are likely to 
spread from the intra- to the public intellectual arena’118. 
 
In order to uncover the reasons behind the transition from ‘intra-intel- 
lectual’ to ‘extra-intellectual’ in the realm of ideas, Baert proposes a shift 
in emphasis from ‘text-based’119 methods, which tend to be concerned 
with endless exegesis and interpretation for the sake of interpretation, 
and personalistic accounts, which tend to be ‘preoccupied with motives 
and strategies of individual thinkers’120, as well as idealistic frameworks, 
which ‘tend to treat the intellectual field as in relative isolation from 
external factors’121, towards a genuinely sociological approach, which 
seeks to do justice to the significance of the social conditions of produc- 
tion that undergird both the constitution and the evolution of knowl- 
edge and belief systems. Such an investigative project, then, endeavours 
to study ‘the diffusion of a set of ideas from the intra- to the public intel- 
lectual domain’122. It aims to accomplish this not simply in hermeneu- 
ticist, personalistic, or idealistic terms, but, rather, by putting forward a 
research model that is conceptually, methodologically, and empirically 
‘sensitive to the broader institutional and cultural dimensions that have 
bearing on the intellectual field’123. By definition, a sociologically reflex- 
ive undertaking needs to be open, non-dogmatic, and multifactorial, in 
the sense that it ‘avoids imposing too rigid a theoretical framework from 
the outset’124 and, furthermore, makes both a conscious and an explicit 
‘effort not to exclude a priori any factors that might have been constitu- 
tive of the making’125 of the social, political, ideological, or intellectual 
movement under scrutiny. 
In essence, this posture leads us to Baert’s plea for a theory of position- 
ing. The twofold assumption underlying this perspective is that ‘through 
their work writers position themselves intellectually’126 and that, moreo- 
ver, ‘this positioning affects whether their ideas are taken up by others and, 
if successful, how they are adopted’127. To be exact, such a ‘positionist’ 
approach is based on the following three presuppositions: 
 
1. Thinkers, researchers, and paradigm-inventers increase the pros- 
pect of disseminating their contributions, not only in the intra- 
intellectual but also in the public intellectual  domain,  if  their  
ideas ‘are “packaged” in terms of a coherent intellectual doctrine
 and “labelled”’128. Intellectual ideas—which are mediated by the 
dynamic circle of affirmation and negation, proposition and con- 
tradiction, construction and deconstruction, private background 
preparation and public foreground presentation—appear to stand a 
greater chance of capturing, if not colonizing, the public imagina- 
tion if they are delivered ‘in a unified fashion and as part of a coher- 
ent doctrine’129. 
2. The relative success, consolidation, and  spread  of  an  intellec-  
tual doctrine depends on the logistical, ideological, institutional, 
and—in numerous cases—charismatic capacity of those endorsing 
it to establish an efficient, vibrant, and resourceful relationship ‘vis-
à-vis the intellectual establishment,  the  publishing  industry and the 
critics’130. 
3. An intellectual doctrine can enter the public intellectual domain, 
and thereby capture significant parts of the Zeitgeist prominent in a 
given society, on condition that ‘it manages to resonate with recent 
socio-political experiences’131 of particular sectors of the population 
and only to the extent that it achieves this in a more convincing, 
pioneering, and inspiring fashion than ‘older, established ideas’132. 
 
 
V. Baert’s Five Central Hypotheses 
 
 
On  the  basis  of  the  aforementioned presuppositions,  Baert  formulates 
five central hypotheses, which shall be considered in this section. 
 
1. Ideas spread more rapidly if those who endorse them succeed in 
developing ‘intricate connections within the world of critics’133. In 
most cases, this requires their advocates to establish ‘a good rap- 
port with the journalistic world’134, in whose discursive spaces of 
argumentation they seek approval and recognition. 
2. Ideas spread more rapidly if hitherto widely accepted—or even 
hegemonic—knowledge and belief systems undergo a validity cri- 
sis within society, either because they ‘no longer resonate with a 
larger public’135 or because their advocates ‘have lost legitimacy or 
have diminished authority’136 in terms of their capacity to set the 
agenda by determining cognitive parameters of objectivity, norma- 
tivity, and perceptibility. 
 3. Ideas spread more rapidly, and also more effectively, if they are sys- 
tematically promoted and widely disseminated by key players of the 
publishing industry, capable of tapping into a dynamic and adapt- 
able supply-demand chain of ‘a “high-brow” mass market’137: the 
stronger an intellectual’s connections to dominant agents within 
the publishing industry, the better his or her chances of establish- 
ing him- or herself as a prominent public figure with paradigmatic 
influence within the academic field in particular and within society 
in general. 
4. Ideas spread more rapidly if those who subscribe to them are pre- 
pared to make use of supplementary communication and dissemi- 
nation channels, such as ‘public lectures and radio or television 
appearances’138 as well as, in the ‘digital age’139, social and alterna- 
tive media. 
5. Ideas spread more rapidly if ‘they resonate with the broader cul- 
tural climate among the educated classes’140 and permit large sec- 
tions of the cultural elite and/or of the wider population to  
identify with them, insofar as they reflect their own concerns, pre- 
occupations, and experiences. Irrespective of how sophisticated, 
original, insightful, and pertinent a specific set of ideas may be, if   
it fails ‘to connect with the recent and present experiences of the 
people involved’141 in a particular cultural sphere, it will not man- 
age to penetrate, let alone to hegemonize, the collective imagina- 
tion of the public intellectual arena, and even less so of the rest of 
the population. 
 
Baert is keen to avoid any misunderstandings arising from a misread-  
ing of his plea for a positionist approach to the study of Sartre’s suc-    
cess story. Drawing attention to the ground-breaking influence of Henri 
Bergson’s L’évolution créatrice142, Baert spells out that he is ‘not argu- 
ing that Sartre was the first French philosopher to gain public promi- 
nence’143. Yet,  the rise of Sartre and existentialism in the mid-1940s is     
a case in point, since it demonstrates the various challenges attached to 
the sociological task of exploring ‘the emergence of the modern notion of the 
intellectual’144. 
In this context, the Dreyfus affair145—which unfolded in the 1890s  
and which, to a significant degree, both triggered and expressed deep 
ideological divisions in France between 1894 and 1906—is of paramount
 importance, illustrating the centrality of two diametrically opposed concep- 
tions of what it means to be an intellectual: 
 
– On the one hand, the so-called Dreyfusards used the term ‘intel- 
lectual’ in a positive and affirmative manner. For them, intellectuals 
could be conceived of as ‘principled defenders of true French values 
of justice and truth’146. On this account, one could and should refer 
to them ‘with pride’147, recognizing that they had made, and would 
continue to make,  invaluable  contributions  to  the  development  
of knowledge in particular and of human civilization in general. 
Following this line of thought, the term ‘intellectual’ took on the  
role of ‘a self-congratulatory concept’148, whose empowering con- 
notations were confiscated by and mobilized for those who were in 
need of scholarly self-justification—namely, intellectuals themselves. 
– On the other hand, the so-called anti-Dreyfusards employed the  
term ‘intellectual’  in  a  negative  and  suspicious  manner.  Insofar  
as they used this label ‘pejoratively and invariably with a sarcastic 
undertone’149, they sought to make fun of what they perceived as 
‘the intellectualism of intellectuals’150—that is, of a self-sufficient 
attitude based on a toxic mixture of vanity, narcissism, and elitism. 
In their eyes, intellectuals were socially awkward and self-deceiving 
individuals, who—while, as de facto ‘outsiders’151, existing on the 
margins of the national community—‘drew on abstract thinking’152, 
spoke a private language, and remained caught up in self-sufficient 
thought experiments,  ‘out  of  touch  with  the  historical  roots’153  
of everyday culture shared by ordinary people. According to the 
anti-Dreyfusards, most intellectuals were little more than ‘pretend- 
ers’154—that is, ‘would-be cultured people’155  specializing  in  the 
art of image management and self-promotion. There was a strong 
nationalistic—if not, purist and racist—undercurrent in this mode  
of thought, insofar as anti-Dreyfusards assumed that a large number 
of prominent intellectuals were ‘of foreign extraction’156, aiming to 
cover up the fact that, in reality, they were ‘unable to match the 
cultural and aesthetic attributes of those with a long French ances- 
try’157. 
 
Eventually, Dreyfusards were triumphant and, consequently, succeeded in 
ensuring that the affirmative, rather than the pejorative, conception of ‘the 
intellectual’ established itself as a predominant and positive reference point
 in the imaginary of twentieth-century discourses in the humanities and 
social sciences, but also, at least to some extent, outside academic circles. 
In relation to the aforementioned distinction, Baert makes two addi- 
tional observations. 
 
1. When examining the ‘Manifesto of the Intellectuals’158, it is strik- 
ing that their professional status appeared to endow them with the 
privilege of exerting ‘authority over the wider public’159, implying 
that, more generally, they would find themselves in an epistemically 
superior position. 
2. On both sides of the argument, the intellectual was portrayed as     
a discursive as well as an embodied entity, ‘actively engaged in the 
world, in particular involved in the politics of the day’160. 
 
Owing to their concern with the ideals of liberté, égalité, and fraternité, 
most intellectuals are unambiguously ‘situated on the left of the politi-  
cal spectrum’161. Due to their subversive tendencies—expressed in their 
commitment to challenging the status quo as well as to questioning estab- 
lished behavioural, ideological, and institutional patterns of existence— 
,they are ‘anti-conformists who distrust le pouvoir’162. Given their shared 
belief in the values of the Enlightenment—epitomized in the Kantian 
defence of the emancipatory potential that is presumably inherent in the 
civilizational triad of Verstand, Vernunft, and Urteilskraft163—, ‘they 
present themselves as the voice of reason against government forces’164, 
especially where these amount to arbitrary forms of authoritarian state 
power. The notion that intellectuals subscribe to normative agendas moti- 
vated by a ‘progressive political commitment’165 has become a common- 
place assumption—not only in France, but also in other national contexts. 
Indeed, ‘by the mid-1940s the idea of political engagement had become 
the new orthodoxy’166, suggesting that intellectuals were expected to 
position themselves in relation to current affairs and issues of contention. 
The ‘era of the intellectuel engagé’167 had begun. 
 
 
VI. Baert’s Project: 
Overcoming the Deficiencies of Existing Accounts 
 
Baert’s project, pursued in this book, is an ambitious one: it consists,       
as he puts it, in ‘explaining intellectuals’168. Thus, the task that he sets 
himself is not simply to describe, to analyse, to interpret, or to assess
 intellectuals but, in a more fundamental sense, to explain their existence 
and, hence, the socio-historical conditions underlying their coming-into- 
being. To be exact, he seeks to provide a ‘multi-level explanation’169— 
that is, a multifactorial approach that takes into account numerous 
aspects that are of constitutive importance in the development of intellec- 
tual fields and of their protagonists. Such a ‘broader sociological theory 
of intellectuals’170 places particular emphasis on the role of ‘position- 
ing’171, as well as on the role of ‘networks and conflict[s]’172, in shaping 
not only the creation, evolution, dissemination, and reception of ideas 
but also the historical settings within which they can become influential. 
As Baert elucidates with admirable clarity and eloquence, the epis- 
temic validity of dominant narratives concerning both the constitution 
and the function of intellectuals in modern societies suffers from a num- 
ber of significant limitations and shortcomings. In this regard, the fol- 
lowing five issues are particularly important. 
 
1. The empiricist bias refers to the problem that some studies of intel- 
lectuals are insufficiently theoretical. Just as theoreticist accounts 
of social agents, structures, and phenomena fall short of engaging 
with the empirical dimensions of intellectual fields, their empiricist 
counterparts fail to provide conceptually sophisticated frameworks 
capable of challenging naïve, stereotypical, and common-sense 
understandings of reality. According to Baert, scholars concerned 
with the writing of ‘intellectual history’173, rather than with the pur- 
suit of a critical ‘sociology of intellectuals’174, are often guilty of this 
empiricist bias, especially if they are obsessed with ‘deciphering the 
context and depicting the intellectual moves within it’175, instead of 
aiming to articulate ‘broader theoretical considerations’176 contrib- 
uting to the social-scientific comprehension of significant patterns, 
trends, and lines of development. As Baert remarks, however, ‘even 
more sociologically inclined authors do not always elaborate on their 
theoretical stance’177, shying away from the laborious task of embed- 
ding their empirical findings within a solid conceptual architecture. 
2. The motivational bias refers to the problems arising from the fact 
that some research programmes ‘attempt systematically to uncover 
the motivations or intentions behind intellectual interventions’178. 
In fact, such a methodological strategy reflects an epistemologi-   
cal framework of presuppositions, which is (a) motivationalist,
 in  the  sense  that  it seeks  to shed light on  an intellectual impetus, 
(b) intentionalist, in the sense that it aims to expose an intellectual 
purpose, and (c) voluntarist, in the sense that it strives to unearth 
an intellectual will or desire. In Baert’s eyes, an illustrative example 
of this kind  of approach can  be  found in  the  Cambridge School  
of Intellectual History179, which—owing to its ‘emphasis on ‘the 
“linguistic” or “ideological context” in which intellectual inter- 
ventions take place’180—fails to take into consideration, let alone 
to explain, the role of ‘the cultural landscape’181 and of the wider 
socio-historical setting within which intellectual ideas, currents, 
and paradigms emerge and develop. It is not enough, then, to  
study the ‘intellectual milieu’182 within which ideas gain, or fail to 
gain, referential currency; it is just as important to scrutinize the 
wider societal situation in which an intellectual field is situated.     
A crucial analytical mistake consists in taking ‘the meaning of an 
intellectual intervention within a given context to be synonymous 
with the intent behind it’183, as if its seemingly obvious teleologi- 
cal function could be taken at face value. For the sake of epistemic 
clarity, it is vital to draw a distinction between, on the one hand,  
the impetus, purpose, and desire behind an intellectual interven- 
tion and, on the other hand, the effect—or, indeed, the multiple 
effects—of an intellectual intervention.184 What matters, from a 
pragmatist perspective, are the consequences of an intellectual inter- 
vention, rather than the motivations, intentions, or will behind it. 
 
So rather than speculating on what certain intellectuals through  
their interventions intend to achieve, we shall see that positioning 
theory provides the conceptual tools to investigate how they and 
their products might acquire institutional or symbolic (dis)advan- 
tages within the cultural and political arenas in which they find 
themselves or in which those texts or ideas are appropriated. […] 
[T]he theory suggested here opens up conceptual space for the 
exploration of the social mechanisms through which some intellectu- 
als come to prominence and others do not and, related, certain texts 
acquire classical status and others do not.185 
 
Thus, such a positionist account highlights that, whereas it is dif- 
ficult, if not futile, ‘to speculate about the motivations behind intel- 
lectual choices’186, it is sociologically illuminating to focus on the
 effects of intellectual performances, which—unlike hidden inten- 
tions or desires—can be empirically studied, if not measured. 
3. The structural bias refers to the problems resulting from reductive 
‘attempts to explain individual decisions by sociological determi- 
nants’187. The ‘soft’ version of this bias is illustrated in the con- 
tention that individual decisions are shaped by structural forces, 
whereas the ‘hard’ version of this bias is reflected in the claim that 
individual decisions are determined by structural forces. To be sure, 
one may seek to uncover a variety of structural forces: social, cul- 
tural, economic, demographic, political, ideological, or linguistic— 
to mention only a few. While, following the Durkheimian tradition 
of sociological analysis, social facts can, and should, be examined  
in relation to other social facts, this does not mean that—despite 
their influence by social forces—individual motivations, intentions, 
or desires can be reduced to social facts.188 The importance of this 
difference lies at the heart of the Durkheimian distinction between 
‘social facts’ and ‘individual instances’.189 It would be erroneous, 
then, to explain an intellectual’s philosophical or ideological orien- 
tation exclusively in terms of their social background.190 In short, 
what needs to be avoided is ‘conflating sociological and individual 
explanations’191, that is, providing merely structural explanations 
of individual beliefs or behaviours. 
4. The authenticity bias refers to the problems attached to the flawed 
assumption that ‘intellectuals have a clear sense of their identity 
and values, with these self-notions guiding their work and the 
choices they make’192. It is tempting to take what intellectuals have 
to say about themselves at face value, especially if one sympathizes 
with them or finds their work fascinating. Yet, as critical sociolo- 
gists, we need to resist the temptation to idealize intellectuals, by 
glorifying their works, romanticizing their public and/or private 
lives, and hypostatizing their capacity to develop—and to project— 
a sense of truthfulness, uniqueness, and genius-like matchlessness. 
 
[T]he authenticity bias is integral to a particular genre of intellec- 
tual biography that attributes particular significance to the author’s 
self-description as a guide for understanding the various intellectual 
moves that he or she made.193 
 It is true that most intellectuals construct narratives about them- 
selves, which they present both to themselves and to others; one 
may even gather evidence to support the suspicion that these narra- 
tives ‘shape their creative output’194. This does not mean, however, 
that intellectuals constitute entirely self-conscious, as well as behav- 
iourally and ideologically coherent, entities, whose endeavours are 
expressions of their ‘authenticity’, in the sense that they are totally 
in sync with their identities, convictions, values, and worldviews— 
let alone, with their everyday behaviour. In order to avoid falling 
into the trap of interpretive idealism or romanticism, based on the 
naïve belief that intellectuals are the epitome of human authentic- 
ity derived from their pursuit of higher meanings through the quest 
for enlightenment and creativity, we need to account for the fact 
that the intellectual field—similar to other social fields—is a realm of 
struggle between asymmetrically positioned agents. 
 
Whether within the academy or outside it, intellectuals operate 
within competitive arenas, struggling over symbolic and institutional 
recognition and scarce financial resources. It makes a lot of sense  
[…] to recognize the extent to which their interventions—whether 
through books, articles or speeches—are an integral part of this 
power struggle rather than an expression of some deeper self.195 
 
The intellectual field is marked by a permanent struggle for recogni- 
tion—no less than other social fields that are shaped by power-laden 
dynamics of ranking, competition, and status-acquisition.196 If there 
is one defining characteristic of the existence of intellectuals, it is 
their immersion in power struggles, that is, in conflicts over access 
to symbolic—as well as, increasingly, material and institutional— 
resources. From a positionist perspective, it is crucial  to  estab-  
lish, and to defend, ‘a critical distance vis-à-vis the way in which 
most intellectuals portray themselves to  their  audience’197.  Such 
an approach permits us to question the validity of the potentially 
deceiving signals sent by intellectuals’ foreground performances, 
focusing instead on the unspoken language of truth that manifests 
itself in the—often hidden—background of their ordinary practices. 
To the extent that ‘[i]ntellectuals have a tendency to depict their
 own intellectual trajectory as untainted by […] material, symbolic 
and institutional constraints’198, it is the task of critical sociologists 
to demystify the quest for purity and transcendentality by shedding 
light on the reified nature of scholastic claims to authenticity.199 
5. The stability bias refers to the problems generated by the misleading 
presupposition that ‘early formation makes for fixity of somebody’s 
subsequent intellectual trajectory’200. This assumption is reflected 
in ‘notions of self-concept and habitus’201, endorsed by Neil Gross 
and Pierre Bourdieu respectively.202 On this view, there is always a 
substantial level of ‘fixity within the project and output of an intel- 
lectual’203, which has a tendency to perpetuate itself, thereby dic- 
tating the parameters of what is possible, and what is impossible, 
within a specific horizon of options. Yet, we must resist the desire  
to attribute a sense of all-encompassing and eternal consistency to 
intellectual trajectories, based on how a scholar presents and ‘sees 
him- or herself ’204 and the—in many cases, mystifying—ways in 
which ‘he or she wants to be seen and remembered’205 when seek- 
ing to acquire the status of a ‘classic’. As Baert insists, ‘it is rare for 
intellectuals to stick to a single self-concept or coherent project through- 
out their lives’206. Just like ordinary agents, intellectuals have to 
invent and to reinvent themselves, not only because they may get 
bored if they remain caught up in the same mode of thinking, but 
also because, to the degree that they claim to be in touch with the 
different Zeitgeister of the present, they need to adjust to the con- 
stantly changing challenges by which they are surrounded. Hence, 
most intellectuals have a tendency to ‘reinvent themselves, articu- 
lating new outlooks and taking on new positions’207 within their 
field of expertise in particular and within the wider arena of society 
in general. It is no accident, then, that it is common to distinguish 
between an ‘early’ and a ‘late’ phase when trying to make sense of 
the contributions made by a particular thinker (famous examples, 
in this respect, are Karl Marx and Ludwig Wittgenstein). Being an 
intellectual requires immersion in a horizon of constantly shifting 
relations, expectations, and positions. Indeed, it is Baert’s convic- 
tion that one of the key advantages of positioning theory is that it is 
‘able to capture shifts of this kind’208. 
  
VII. Performative Positioning and Positional Performance 
 
Drawing upon speech act theory, positionist approaches focus on the 
extent to which words, ideas, and discourses—rather than simply ‘rep- 
resenting or mirroring the external world’209—‘accomplish things’210.  
Far from serving a merely constative, affirmative, or mimetic function, 
linguistic expressions fulfil a performative role. Utterances are performa- 
tive, in the sense that they ‘do something’211, have an impact upon the 
world, and construct reality in one way or another. Over the past century, 
‘fewer and fewer philosophers thought it fruitful to conceive of language 
as copying the external world’212, insisting that ‘language is an act which, 
like any act, does something’213. In light of this paradigmatic transition in 
the second half of the twentieth century, there has been a shift away from 
representationalist accounts of knowledge and correspondence theories 
of truth towards constructivist and interpretivist epistemologies.214 
It is in this spirit that Baert proposes to undertake a ‘performative  
turn for the theorizing of intellectuals’215. In accordance with this endeav- 
our, the performative logic that permeates the functioning of language 
pervades, in a similar fashion, the unfolding of intellectual interventions. 
On this account, it is crucial to examine ‘what intellectual interventions 
do and achieve rather than what they represent’216. As Baert points out, 
such a performativist conception of intellectuals may, at first glance, 
appear counterintuitive, in the sense that ‘we tend to think of intellectual 
tracts as somehow representational’217—that is, we are inclined to ‘see 
them as reflecting on the world (or reflecting on the representations of 
others) rather than acting on it’218. 
In short, Baert makes a case for a theoretical stance that may be char- 
acterized as—simultaneously—pragmatist, performativist, and positionist: 
 
1. It is pragmatist, in the sense that it centres on intellectual practices, 
that is, on what intellectuals do and how their interventions impact 
upon reality. 
2. It is performativist, in the sense that it focuses on intellectual 
performances, that is, on the roles that intellectuals take on and 
through which they act in particular ways. 
3. It is positionist, in the sense that it is concerned with intellectual 
positioning, that is, with the ways in which intellectuals situate
 themselves in relation to others, as well as with the ways in which 
they are situated—on the basis of processes of recognition, legiti- 
mation, and social ranking—by others. 
 
For instance, an academic journal article—irrespective of how abstract, 
specialist, impenetrable, or esoteric it may appear—‘does a wide range of 
things’219, and it does so on various levels and, potentially, in relation to 
different agents directly or indirectly involved: ‘for the author, for the 
authors cited, for the discipline’220, for the readership, for the language  
in which it is written, for the development of knowledge, for the aca- 
demic field—in short, for the world. 
The previous reflection leads us from the pragmatist and performa- 
tivist aspects to the positionist dimensions of Baert’s analysis. The term 
positioning, as it is employed here, ‘indicates the process by which cer- 
tain features are attributed to an individual or a group or some other 
entity’221. As such, it designates a course of action that involves the assig- 
nation of meaning performed by an individual or a collective subject 
capable of judgement and recognition in relation to others. Positioning   
is an act of placing: within a particular field of the social universe, agents 
seek to place themselves, while being placed by other agents. Acts of 
positioning can be performed consciously or unconsciously, deliberately 
or unintentionally, calculatedly or inadvertently. Thus, human agents are 
equipped with the capacity ‘to alter how they represent themselves and 
how they locate others’222. Acts of positioning, however, are often car- 
ried out by intuitively guided performers, who are—to a large extent— 
‘unaware of the illocutionary force’223 that undergirds their practices. 
For Baert, positioning theory is inconceivable without a paradigmatic 
shift in emphasis from the structuralist concern with stability, constancy, 
and determinacy to the action-focused interest in fluidity, irregularity, 
and indeterminacy: 
 
Whereas explanations in terms of rules and roles denote stability, position- 
ing theory acknowledges fluidity—the ongoing changes in how people 
identify themselves and position others.224 
 
Positioning theory has been applied—extensively—to the study of per- 
sonality formation (at the micro-level), face-to-face interactions (at the 
meso-level), and international relations and politics (at the macro-level).
 Yet, the literature, one finds only a few examples in which it has been 
systematically employed for the sociological exploration of the intellec- 
tual realm. In order to avoid falling into the trap of the ‘individualistic 
bias’225, however, it is vital to examine the dynamic of positioning in 
relation to the ‘social setting’226 in which it takes place, thereby account- 
ing for the fact that—on several levels—it constitutes ‘a collective 
endeavour’227—that is, a collective practice, performance, and projection. 
 
VIII. Positioning: 
The Dialectics of a Tension-laden Process 
 
Baert’s starting point is a simple one: all intellectual interventions— 
irrespective of whether they are articulated by means of writing, speaking, or 
artistic expression, such as music or painting—‘involve positioning’228. For 
Baert, the concept of intellectual intervention refers to ‘any contribution to 
the intellectual realm, whether  it is in the form of a book,  an article, a blog, 
a speech or indeed part of any of these (say, a passage or a sentence)’229. 
Notwithstanding whether or not they are aware of the situatedness underly- 
ing their contribution, ‘such intervention locates the author(s) or speaker(s) 
within the intellectual field or within a broader socio-political or artistic 
arena’230. In other words, positioning constitutes an integral component of 
intellectual interventions. According to Baert, intellectual statements bring 
about two types of effects: (1) the positioning itself and (2) the dissemination 
of ideas, which may reinforce or undermine an agent’s career and his or her 
chances of obtaining ‘symbolic and institutional recognition’231. 
Positioning, then, needs to be understood in terms of both endoge- 
nous and exogenous agency: on the one hand, there is ‘an “agent” , mak- 
ing the intervention and doing the positioning’232; on the other hand, 
there is ‘a “positional party”, being attributed certain features’233. 
Regardless of whether we are dealing with an individual subject or with a 
collective subject, all carriers of intellectual interventions depend on both 
endogenous and exogenous forms of agency. In cases of self-position- 
ing234, ‘the agent and positioned party coincide’235, giving him or her 
the opportunity to choose where exactly he or she wishes to be placed 
within an intellectual field. Yet, self-positioning cannot be dissociated 
from the positioning of other agents.236 
One of the most effective forms of positioning is  anti-positioning.  In 
fact, taking a position in opposition to another position—which may be
 associated with a particular intellectual current, paradigm, or set of assump- 
tions—can be a source of strength. Thus, ‘it is often in relation to a posi- 
tioned party other than oneself—for instance, by contrasting one’s own 
position with those of other individual(s) or a group—that self-positioning 
is at its most effective’237. In intellectual circles, the willingness to challenge 
another epistemic position, or various other epistemic positions, forms a 
central element of the creation of a presuppositional stance. 
Positioning can be achieved both subtly and overtly: 
 
• Subtle forms of positioning are essential to intellectual practices that 
are directly or indirectly constrained by repressive external political 
forces—as, for instance, in absolutist, authoritarian, or dictatorial 
regimes. In addition, they can be vital to intellectual interventions 
whose authors wish to remain anonymous or do not wish to be 
brought into connection with what they may perceive as the cogni- 
tive straitjacket of one specific viewpoint or mode of thought. 
• Overt forms of positioning are particularly common in introductory, 
as well as concluding, sections of articles, books, and speeches, in 
which intellectuals are given the opportunity to situate themselves 
and their interventions in relation to other scholars.238 
 
The invention of intellectual labels is tantamount to the creation of schol- 
arly brands: 
 
Intellectuals often use labels to flag their own position. These labels tend   
to capture the core idea in a succinct fashion. […] Of course, intellectu-      
als use labels not just to refer to themselves but also [to refer] to others, 
sometimes with the aim of criticizing or ridiculing their work. […] The 
introduction of a label can facilitate the dissemination of ideas, but the clar- 
ity of its meaning and its distinctiveness might be undermined once others 
start subscribing to the same label.239 
 
In Baert’s view, two forms of positioning are particularly important: 
 
1. intellectual positioning, which locates the agent within the intellec- 
tual field; and 
2. politico-ethical positioning, which requires the agent to take ‘a 
broader political or ethical stance’240, going beyond the narrow 
limits of the intellectual sphere. 
 To the extent that this conceptual distinction is based on two ideal-types, 
however, it is important to point out that, ‘[i]n practice, intellectual 
positioning and political-ethical positioning tend to be intertwined’241. 
Furthermore, these two forms of positioning may overlap with other 
forms of positioning (such as artistic positioning,  aesthetic  position-  
ing, ethnic positioning, cultural positioning, etc.). As Baert perceptively 
remarks, ‘a politically charged climate can lead to the blurring of the dif- 
ference between politico-ethical and intellectual positioning’242. In such 
an atmosphere, thinkers and commentators may feel obliged to take a 
stance in relation to key issues, thereby illustrating that the seemingly 
most disinterested, neutral, and unbiased pursuit of scholarly activity can- 
not be divorced from the ideological presuppositions to which its pro- 
tagonists consciously or unconsciously subscribe. 
 
 
IX. Positioning: Performative 
Tools, Narratives, and Argumentation 
 
1. Performative Tools 
Performative tools can be defined as ‘material and symbolic means that 
enable an effective intervention’243. From a sociological point of view,     
it is crucial to conceive of intellectual products as performative, in order 
to account for the multiple ‘material and symbolic props and devices that 
help to bring about effectively the intervention or positioning’244. In 
order for a publication of a book or a journal article to have an impact   
on the field of intellectual productions, for example, it is essential that  
the publishers develop and employ marketing strategies. The influence  
of an intellectual output depends not only on the symbolic power of its 
author but also, to a large extent, on the prestige of the publisher. In the 
case of Sartre, this is obvious, given his personal connections with lead- 
ing editors at Gallimard. 
Metaphorically speaking, ‘vitamin C’—that is, ‘vitamin connection’— 
constitutes a vital element in the career of an intellectual. Sartre’s abil- 
ity to capitalize on his connections in multiple fields—above all, in the 
fields of philosophy, literature, theatre, journalism, and politics—permit- 
ted him to carve a niche for himself as a transdisciplinary public intellec- 
tual. The unequal distribution of performative tools is embedded in the 
establishment of formal and informal hierarchies that involve the explicit
 or implicit ‘ranking of research institutions, publishers and journals’245  
as well as of the languages in which their outputs are written. If a textual 
contribution is made and published in one of the hegemonic languages  
of the contemporary humanities and social sciences (that is, in English, 
French, or German), it is more likely to be read and taken seriously by an 
audience of legitimizing agents than if it is produced in a non-hegemonic 
language (such as Basque, Catalan, Finish, Araucano, or Mapudungun— 
to mention but a few). 
 
2. Narratives 
Narratives, as they are developed in the intellectual field, can be con- 
ceived of as ‘relatively coherent stories that accompany and make pos- 
sible effective positioning’246. Intellectuals, similar to other agents, can 
produce both small narratives and grand narratives: the former refer to 
context-dependent stories, emphasizing the particularity and irreducibil- 
ity of local developments in a given society; the latter stand for context- 
transcendent stories, making a claim to universality and generalizability 
of developments in relation to the course of human history.247 The inti- 
mate relationship between the construction of narratives and processes 
of positioning permeates people’s symbolically mediated involvement in 
reality: 
 
Positioning depends not just on what the narrative explicitly states, but  
also on what it implies and, crucially, what it leaves out. Narratives often 
involve recollections and reconstructions of the past, ranging from an indi- 
vidual’s trajectories to societal pasts.248 
 
Within the intellectual field, narratives that emerge out of dynamics of 
positioning can make reference both to the past (for instance, by making 
‘claims about “cultural trauma”’249) and to the future (for example, by 
proclaiming ‘a new beginning […], a new life or a more just society’250). 
Hence, a choice has to be made between what is included in and what is 
excluded from the story that is being told. 
 
3. Argumentation 
Argumentation constitutes a discursive process oriented towards the 
presentation and elaboration of reasons invoked in order to justify a
 stance, belief, conviction, opinion, or narrative. Within the intellectual 
field, the construction of narratives  hinges  on  carefully  crafted forms 
of argumentation, comparable to those one encounters in the judicial, 
political, and journalistic fields: 
 
Positioning and narratives draw on argumentation, especially in the intel- 
lectual field. It is through arguments that intellectuals differentiate them- 
selves from others or associate themselves with them. In contrast with other 
forms of positioning in which visuals and unconscious associations play      
a significant role (e.g. advertising of a product) , intellectual positioning 
stands or falls with explicit arguments. […] Particularly prevalent in intel- 
lectual positioning are meta-arguments.251 
 
In essence, meta-arguments are arguments about arguments. Given the 
existential significance attached to the role of developing, articulating, and 
exchanging arguments, intellectuals—notably those with pronounced nar- 
cissistic tendencies—may seek to acquire a quasi-religious status, providing 
them with the opportunity to set the agenda in their respective interac- 
tional fields in particular and in society in general, even if—and, often, 
especially when—they claim to be ‘secular intellectuals’252. The remark- 
able discursive influence of prominent ‘preaching’ intellectuals can have 
proselytizing effects, to the degree that they seek to ‘lecture’ different 
members of society about the vital ingredients of ‘the good life’. 
 
 
X. Positioning: A Relational Affair 
 
By definition, positioning constitutes a  relational  affair.  Consequently, 
an intellectual intervention involves a specific form of positioning to the 
extent that it takes place within a field of social agents, who may, or may 
not, take note of, reflect upon, and respond to it. According to Baert,  
three aspects underlying this relational logic are particularly important:253 
 
1. The individual254: The effects that an intellectual intervention may, 
or may not, have are contingent upon the status and symbolic power 
of the individual responsible for it. If, for instance, two agents carry 
out very similar, or even identical, intellectual interventions, these 
may be perceived differently and trigger uneven effects, depending 
on how and where they are positioned—in terms of status, power, 
capital, resources, connections, influence, standpoint, trajectory, and 
reputation—in the social space. Put differently, validity claims are
 legitimacy claims.255 The epistemic validity attached to an intellectual 
statement by a readership or an audience is subject to the degree of 
social legitimacy attributed to it on various levels: ‘Who?’ (author), ‘To 
whom?’ (addressee), ‘When and where?’ (spatiotemporal context), as 
well as ‘How?’ (medium). To the extent that these variables differ, an 
intellectual intervention will have an impact in one form or another. 
2. Other individuals256: The effects that an intellectual  intervention 
may,  or may not,  have  are shaped  by the role of ‘other individuals  
at play within the same field’257. For this reason, rather than con- 
ceiving of intellectuals as atomized agents, we need to acknowledge 
that they are interdependent: ‘[s]hifts in the positioning of other indi- 
viduals affect our positioning and self-positioning’258. In the case of 
Sartre, it is impossible to understand his shifting positions within the 
intellectual field without taking into account his relation to  other 
‘key players’—such as Karl Marx (1818–1883), Friedrich Nietzsche 
(1844–1900), Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), Émile Durkheim 
(1858–1917), Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), Maurice Merleau- 
Ponty (1908–1961), Simone de Beauvoir (1908–1986), Claude Lévi-
Strauss (1908–2009), and Michel Foucault (1926–1984). 
3. Context259: The effects that an intellectual intervention  may,  or 
may not, have hinge on ‘the specific intellectual or socio-political 
context’260 in which it takes place. The ‘historically rooted sensi- 
tivities’261 shared by particular groups of agents are embedded 
within spatiotemporally contingent settings. Thus, the aforemen- 
tioned relationship between an individual and other individuals is 
always context-dependent. This is reflected in the fact that ‘the same 
intellectual intervention might generate different positioning when 
transposed to different contexts’262. The context-dependence of 
intellectual interventions is indicative of the relativity  permeat- 
ing all claims to epistemic validity. Noteworthy, in this respect, is 
the fact that how intellectuals are perceived, and how their works are 
received, is largely beyond their control. The most refined techniques 
of image- and impression-management cannot do away with the 
contingency that pervades not only the contents but also, crucially, 
the effects of intellectual outputs. Hence, ‘even when intellectuals 
are involved in carefully constructed or calculated positioning and 
self-positioning, not all effects of their intellectual  interventions 
are within their control’263. Depending on what kind of audiences
 they reach, ‘intellectual interventions can amount to very different 
forms of positioning and self-positioning’264. Posthumous assess- 
ments of scholarly contributions are a striking example of the fact 
that the works of an intellectual can be interpreted and reinter- 
preted in accordance with the normative agendas pursued by other 
intellectuals in diverging spatiotemporal contexts.265 In some cases, 
intellectuals—similar to many artists—are given the credit they 
deserve only after their death; frequently, this happens on the basis 
of posthumously published works.266 To be sure, retrospective 
assessments can lead to harsh judgements concerning the contribu- 
tions made by intellectuals who, because they are no longer alive, 
are deprived of the opportunity to defend themselves.267 
 
 
XI. Positioning: Cooperation and Individualization 
 
As stressed by Baert, in most cases, a cumulative effort of numerous 
attempts is required in order for a scholarly contribution to have a tangi- 
ble impact on the intellectual field or, possibly, on other social fields. 
 
It is rare for a single intellectual intervention to bring about the desired 
effect. In most cases several interventions—often repeating the same posi- 
tion—are necessary to get a message across.268 
 
Of course, one may think of various exceptions. Each ‘big thinker’ tends 
to be associated with a magnum opus, which may represent the main— 
and, in some instances, ground-breaking—work that paved the way for   
a successful career and, in cases of distinction, for a place among the 
‘classics’ and ‘game changers’ in a particular discipline. From a relation- 
alist perspective, however, it appears that not even repeated intellectual 
interventions—either on one topic or on multiple topics—will suffice for 
a scholar to establish him- or herself, because his or her position in the 
field ‘depends on so many other agents’269 and, indeed, on several addi- 
tional variables, two of which are especially significant: 
 
1. Intellectual positioning is inconceivable without intellectual 
networks. Similar to other webs of social relations, intellectual 
networks—since they are generated and sustained by various 
agents—are in a constant state of flux and potentially complex. 
 The networks of an intellectual comprise a large number of agents, who 
engage with him or her and confirm his or her positioning, even if they 
disagree or are overtly hostile. […] The status and recognition of intel- 
lectuals are dependent partly on where they are acknowledged (in which 
journals or book series), and who precisely acknowledges them (what is 
their positioning and status).270 
 
An intellectual’s position within a network of fellow intellectuals, 
then, is the product of his or her immersion in struggles for status 
and recognition. 
2. Intellectual positioning is inconceivable without intellectual teams. 
Intellectual teams are more confined than intellectual networks,   
in the sense that their members ‘actively cooperate in positioning 
themselves, for instance, by grouping around a school or research 
programme, often using a label which makes their work and 
agenda immediately recognizable’271. Hence, in line with Michael 
Farrell’s concept of ‘collaborative circles’272, teams of this kind can 
be described as ‘intense, small groups of innovative artistic and 
intellectual endeavour’273, whose members are united by a shared 
set of ideas, principles, and practices as well as, in some cases, by   
a common institutional basis. Within the intellectual field, team 
membership is a double-edged sword: 
– On the one hand, it can strengthen one’s position in the field, 
especially if one occupies a dominant position within an influ- 
ential current or school of thought. 
– On the other hand, it can weaken one’s position in the field, 
particularly if one occupies a marginal position within a periph- 
eral current or school of thought. 
In any case, positioning within a team through a field and position- 
ing within a field through a team can be regarded as indispensable 
components of intellectual life, constituting ‘an ongoing achieve- 
ment’274, in the sense that a participant’s place in the intellectual 
universe has to be constantly affirmed and reaffirmed in order to 
obtain any normative currency.275 
 
Yet, just as intellectuals rely on processes of collaboration, they depend 
on processes of individualization: 
 Teams capture the cooperative side of intellectual life, but what we call 
‘individualization’ is equally intrinsic to the realm of intellectuals. By 
intellectual individualization, we refer to the process by which intellectuals 
distinguish themselves from others, making themselves look different from 
them and possibly unique.  Individualization  is  achieved  through  care-  
ful self-positioning and positioning, differentiating oneself from others. It 
may involve conflict because the act of differentiating tends to take place 
through criticisms of others. This is not to say that individualization and 
teamwork are necessarily mutually exclusive: intellectuals might collaborate 
with other team members to emphasize their distinct stance and to elabo- 
rate on how this stance differs from that of others.276 
 
In short, collaborative and individuative practices represent two com- 
plementary dynamics in intellectual life. A peculiar phenomenon in this 
respect, which highlights the power-ladenness of the intellectual field, is 
that, ‘[i]n general, the more secure and established one’s position, the less 
one needs to rely on teamwork and the more likely one will press for intellec- 
tual individualization’277. This performative imbalance is due to the fact 
that socially recognized and institutionally protected intellectuals tend  
to enjoy a greater degree of material and symbolic autonomy than those 
who are only just ‘entering the game’ or those who have been ‘playing 
the game’—or, rather, ‘trying to play the game’—for a while but without 
much success and who, hence, find themselves in highly volatile, depend- 
ent, and potentially precarious situations. 
In light of the previous reflections, we can conclude that at least five 
main parties are involved in the positioning process: (1) the intellectual 
him- or herself as an individual; (2) team members; (3) field or network 
members; (4) members of other social fields, notably of the political and 
journalistic fields; (5) members of the general public and, in an even larger 
sense, of society as a whole. 
 
 
XII. Baert’s ‘Paradigm Shift’ 
 
1. The Hermeneutics of Positioning 
As Baert spells out, we face a number of serious philosophical and meth- 
odological issues278 when reflecting upon what we may describe as ‘the 
hermeneutics  of  positioning’.  Particularly  important  in  this   regard 
are intellectual forms of ‘intentional positioning’279, which reveal the 
‘premeditated nature of intellectual interventions’280. Conscious and
 explicit modes of positioning are vital to the differential unfolding of 
intellectual life in the modern era: 
 
Almost every formal presentation of new intellectual work begins with a 
‘position statement’ identifying the work on which it builds, the work that 
complements and supports it, and the work by other authors that it con- 
tradicts or supersedes.281 
 
In essence, position statements express the intellectual’s need to take a 
stance and place him- or herself within a field of expertise and in relation 
to other scholars. Indeed, when providing a credible justification for the 
relevance and originality of a piece of research submitted for peer review, 
position statements—which are usually included in the introductory and 
concluding sections of a manuscript—are a precondition for publication. 
Conscious and explicit positioning is ‘built into the  modern  scientific 
and social-scientific paper’282, whose authors are expected not only to 
spell out how it relates to other—already published—studies but also to 
explain the extent to which it challenges and goes beyond contributions 
previously made within the field of expertise in which it is placed.283 
Wary of any attempts to overstate the role of motives behind intel- 
lectual interventions, Baert suggests that ‘the solution lies in abandoning 
a vocabulary of intentions for a vocabulary of effects’284. Notwithstanding 
the various sociological implications of this consequentialist perspec- 
tive, Baert’s ‘hermeneutics of positioning’ places a strong emphasis on 
the interpretive and meaning-laden dimensions permeating the ways in 
which intellectual works are produced as well as received: 
 
[…] the study of an author’s positioning needs to be accompanied by a her- 
meneutic understanding of the experiences, concerns, and hopes of the audi- 
ence within the socio-political context at the time.285 
 
Given their spatiotemporally contingent constitution, ‘intellectual inter- 
ventions “travel” from one context to another’286 and trigger different 
reactions in different places and at different times. Two methodological 
remarks are crucial when trying to make sense of Baert’s proposed para- 
digm shift from a ‘vocabulary of intentions’ to a ‘vocabulary of effects’287: 
 
a. Stability: Positioning theory seeks to provide a convincing expla- 
nation for the relative stability that appears to pervade most
 intellectual careers and trajectories. To be clear, positioning theory 
aims to avoid the aforementioned ‘stability bias’, which—argu- 
ably—weakens the quality of Gross’s and Bourdieu’s respective 
interpretations of the intellectual field. It endeavours to accomplish 
this by accounting ‘for a certain element of fluidity in how intel- 
lectuals project themselves and how they locate others’288. It would 
be erroneous, however, to assume that there is endless room for 
developmental flexibility. In fact, it is ‘rare for intellectuals to rein- 
vent themselves on a regular basis’289—partly, because they would 
lose credibility if, every few years, they sought to shift from one 
paradigm to another, making them appear unstable and volatile; 
and, partly, because it usually takes a substantial amount of time   
to develop a solid set of ideas and principles within a given field, 
making it hard to create, and to subscribe to, numerous intellectual 
approaches in a single lifespan, especially if they are diametrically 
opposed to one another. 
b. Evolution: Positioning theory seeks to provide a convincing expla- 
nation for the ‘evolutionary logic’290 permeating the intellectual 
field.291 In this sense, positioning theory constitutes a research 
programme that ‘explores the selective advantages or disadvantages 
for the agents and for  the  intellectual  interventions’292.  Similar  
to many other social fields, within the intellectual field, agents 
relate to one another in terms of a contradictory dialectics of col- 
laboration and competition. Irrespective of whether one favours 
Darwinian or Lamarckian (or any other) accounts of evolution293 
when examining social interactions, it is difficult to overlook the 
fact that, within the intellectual field, an agent’s fate is decided, to   
a large extent, by an underlying logic that may be described as ‘the 
survival of the fittest’. The constant struggle for access to mate-   
rial and symbolic resources shapes the value-, interest-, and power- 
laden ways in which agents relate to one another in the intellectual 
field. One of the most interesting issues in this regard remains the 
question of ‘why some intellectual interventions are rewarded and 
diffused and others are not’294 and, thus, why some intellectuals  
are more influential than others. 
 
As Baert points out, processes of positioning and repositioning involve 
both costs and risks. To the extent that ‘positioning is not a one-off
 event, but an ongoing achievement’295, which can, from time to time, 
require a significant degree of repositioning, it may turn out to be costly 
for those undertaking it. To the extent that ‘repositioning might be 
noticed by other intellectuals who might demand justification’296, those 
seeking to accomplish it might be obliged to take serious reputational 
risks. Indeed, according to Baert, ‘radical repositioning is rarely attained 
without loss of credibility’297, as it may appear hardly justifiable, espe- 
cially if an intellectual decides to shift towards a position that is, at least 
on the face of it, diametrically opposed to the position that he or she pre- 
viously endorsed. 
 
The more the intellectual is known, the more likely the repositioning will 
have to be accounted for. In sum, repositioning entails reputational risks. 
Both factors—the costs and the reputational risks—explain why repositioning 
tends to be found among either firmly established intellectuals, such as ten- 
ured academics, or those who are just starting off and have not yet publicly 
cemented their position.298 
 
In other words, repositioning constitutes a process that may be under- 
taken either by established scholars or by newcomers; it may have mul- 
tiple consequences, depending on where an agent is positioned in the 
intellectual field (and, for that matter, in other social fields) when initiat- 
ing the process of redefining his or her objective, normative, and/or sub- 
jective place in the universe. 
 
2. A Tripartite Typology of Intellectuals 
Baert aims to scrutinize the conditions underlying the ‘transformation   
of the public intellectual’299. Faced with this challenge, he makes it clear 
that, in his view, the analytical emphasis needs to be placed on effects, 
rather than on intentions: 
 
There is no need to resort to arguments about intentional positioning. The 
effects speak louder than words: regardless of Sartre’s intentions, his intellec- 
tual interventions gave him symbolic recognition and helped the diffusion 
of his ideas.300 
 
The effects > intentions formula underpins Baert’s entire study. On his 
account, it is because of the effects that a thinker’s presence may have
 on the intellectual field in particular and on the public sphere in gen-   
eral that some varieties of being a ‘public intellectual’ are viable in one 
context but not viable in another; an intellectual’s intentions are largely 
irrelevant to his or her field-specific positioning. In order to understand 
both the rise and the demise of Sartre and existentialism, then, it is nec- 
essary to take into consideration the fact that he ‘was a particular type   
of public intellectual’301 and, more specifically, to concede that the kind  
of public engagement for which he stood during the time of his success  
‘is no longer quite as viable today as it was back then’302. With the aim   
of illustrating this in further detail, Baert proposes to distinguish three 
modes of positioning, which are—ultimately—epitomized in three types 
of intellectuals: (a) authoritative public intellectuals, (b) expert public 
intellectuals, and (c) embedded or dialogical public intellectuals. 
 
a. Authoritative public intellectuals rely on, as well as represent, ‘high 
cultural capital’303. They tend to  be  trained  in,  to  build  upon,  
and to contribute to high-profile disciplines, such as philosophy, 
thereby—consciously or unconsciously—perpetuating the ‘inside- 
outside divide’304 sustained by paradigm-driven gatekeepers and 
protagonists of particular academic fields and subfields. Typically, 
they find themselves in the advantageous position of being able     
to draw upon the material and symbolic resources to which they 
have access due to their ‘very privileged background’305. Given  
their prominent and privileged position within society, authorita- 
tive public intellectuals ‘can oppose the establishment without ever 
substantially losing status or authority’306. Since they usually grap- 
ple with a wide range of issues, some of which are characterized by 
a profoundly inter- or transdisciplinary nature, they are inclined to 
address a large variety of topics and questions ‘without being experts 
as such’307—mainly,  because the scope of the subjects they cover  
is, in many cases, extraordinarily vast. In terms of their positioning 
within hierarchically structured fields and subfields, they have a ten- 
dency to ‘speak from above—at, rather than with, their audience’308. 
Thus, they appear to have a somewhat condescending attitude—not 
only towards ordinary members of society, but also towards fellow 
intellectuals. For the right or the wrong reasons, they are thought of 
as possessing ‘a strong moral voice’309, making judgements and rec- 
ommendations about the normative parameters underlying defensi- 
ble ideological, behavioural, and institutional patterns. 
 Authoritative public intellectuals tend to be  particularly success- 
ful in societies in which intellectual contributions are significantly 
valued and, hence, have currency beyond the sphere of specialists in 
the humanities and social sciences. Another precondition for their 
triumph, however, is reflected in the existence of socio-protectionist 
mechanisms that guarantee that ‘cultural and intellectual capital is 
concentrated within a small elite’310, permitting its select members 
to ‘thrive in a hierarchical educational context’311. Educational hier- 
archies manifest themselves in multiple oppositions: elite universi- 
ties versus average universities, public institutions versus private 
institutions, high-status disciplines versus low-status disciplines— 
to mention only a few.312 The competitive advantage that most 
authoritative public intellectuals have is that, unlike other intellectu- 
als, they can exist ‘independently of academic appointments because of 
independent resources’313, which they can mobilize not simply to get 
by but, crucially, to enhance their careers. 
Traditionally, authoritative public intellectuals have been attributed 
sufficient amounts of symbolic power, enabling them to express their 
opinion on ‘a wide range of social and political issues without being 
criticized for dilettantism’314—not only because their privileged back- 
grounds tend to equip them with plenty of self-confidence, embed- 
ded in a habitus whose raison d’être is based on entitlement, but also 
because, in many cases, they are assigned the role of the charismatic 
leader by other members of society. The intimate link between epis- 
temic validity and social legitimacy is epitomized in the emergence of 
high-profile intellectuals, who enjoy sufficient symbolic authority to 
express their opinion on almost any subject and are granted significant 
levels of credibility even in relation to topics on which they possess no 
expert knowledge, let alone a formal degree or certified competency. 
 
The early part of the twentieth century, especially in parts of Europe, fits 
this ideal type remarkably well. It was the era of the philosopher as a pub- 
lic intellectual.315 
Therefore, the question that poses itself is to what extent the socio- 
historical conditions facilitating the rise of the authoritative public 
intellectual have changed in recent decades. Seeking to respond to 
this question, Baert draws attention to a number of key develop- 
ments, which shall be considered in subsequent sections. 
 b. Expert public intellectuals are driven  by  the  mission  to  gener-  
ate ‘professional knowledge’316. Their task consists in developing 
codified epistemic frameworks that can be understood, first and 
foremost, by specialists who are equipped with the conceptual, 
methodological, and—in some cases—empirical tools that are nec- 
essary to comprehend, and to contribute to, the quasi-private lan- 
guage games of experts. To be clear, expert public intellectuals are 
not necessarily disconnected from the tangible dimensions of social 
reality. In order to elucidate this point, Baert refers to three influ- 
ential social and political thinkers. 
i. In the 1970s, Michel Foucault—while grappling with the 
multifaceted constitution of power relations in human societies— 
conceived of himself as a ‘specific intellectual’317, who was, by 
definition, committed to a ‘focused and expert-driven engage- 
ment’318 with reality. 
ii. In the 1990s, Pierre Bourdieu—while launching a political 
attack on neoliberalism—proposed to use the power of social 
science to shed light on both the causes and the consequences 
of marginalization, discrimination, and pauperization. 
iii. Throughout his career, especially over the past few decades, 
Noam Chomsky—while converting himself into ‘a  public  fig- 
ure as an expert on and critic of American foreign policy’319— 
crossed the bridge between linguistics and politics, taking 
radical and provocative positions, albeit for different reasons, in 
both disciplines. 
What these examples illustrate is that intellectuals can be world- 
renowned experts in a particular field and, at the same time, 
exhibit a genuine commitment to contributing to the progressive 
transformation of social reality. Authoritative public intellectuals 
found themselves in the privileged position of being able to ‘exert 
influence outside their specialist subject entirely through demon- 
strated intellect and educational prowess’320 as well as, in many 
cases, through a sense of entitlement and symbolic power. By con- 
trast, expert public intellectuals rely, almost exclusively, on special- 
ist ‘intellect and acquired knowledge’321 when seeking to mobilize 
their material and symbolic resources in the pursuit of a wider
 normative project, aimed at having a progressive-transformative 
impact upon society. 
c. Dialogical public intellectuals ‘do not assume a superior stance 
towards their publics’322, since, in principle, they stand on an equal 
footing with everyone else. This does not mean that they cannot 
possess a significant amount of (i) authority on or (ii) expertise in a 
particular domain of knowledge. This implies, however, that they 
place the emphasis on (iii) dialogue with different members of the 
wider public. Instead of ‘dictating an ideological agenda or impos- 
ing a political direction’323 on society, they seek to engage in non- 
dogmatic forms of reciprocal communication with citizens and 
non-citizens from all walks of life. Arguably, in the contemporary 
age, there has been a decisive move away from (i) authoritative and 
(ii) expert towards (iii) dialogical public intellectuals. 
 
 
Today, increasingly, intellectuals engage with their publics in a more 
interactive fashion, partly because of the technologies which make 
this dialogical format now possible and to a certain extent blur the 
distinction between public intellectuals and their publics; and partly 
because, with higher educational levels, the publics are no longer will- 
ing to accept entrenched hierarchies as they once did.324 
 
This dialogical approach is exemplified in Michael Burawoy’s conception 
of a ‘public sociology’325, which is founded on an unambiguous com- 
mitment to a ‘critical engagement with the non-academic world’326. On 
this account, the challenge consists in establishing ‘an intellectual and 
social partnership between the sociological researchers and the communi- 
ties they serve, whereby both parties are willing to learn from each other 
and [to] collaborate, while striving for a common political goal’327. If this 
endeavour is taken seriously, then the relationship between intellectual 
and non-intellectual members of the public is conceived of not in terms 
of an insurmountable gulf between ‘epistemic superiority’ and ‘epistemic 
inferiority’ but, rather, in terms of a mutually empowering project based 
on trust, reciprocity, and solidarity—and, therefore, on openness towards 
the possibility of learning from one another by overcoming discrepancies 
of understanding derived from narrow-mindedness, complacency, and 
self-referentiality. 
 3. Paradigmatic Changes 
 
a. Developments within and outside Philosophy 
The first set of changes concerns major developments both within and 
outside philosophy. The most remarkable shift in the balance of discipli- 
nary power, in this respect, is the fact that ‘philosophy has lost to a cer- 
tain extent its previous intellectual dominance’328. In other words, the 
assumption that philosophy constitutes ‘the queen of knowledge’ and, 
hence, a master discipline that stands above all other forms of inquiry  
has come under attack and is, arguably, no longer tenable.329 In fact, it is 
due to significant developments not only outside philosophy—in particu- 
lar, the spread and professionalization of both the natural sciences and 
the social sciences—but also within philosophy—notably, the influence of 
postmodern and neopragmatist approaches—that its hitherto hegemonic 
position has been severely undermined.330 The increasing influence of 
the social sciences, however, appears to be the crucial factor challenging 
the erstwhile preponderant position of philosophy in the intellectual field 
in particular and in the wider domain of systematic knowledge produc- 
tion in general. Baert puts this eloquently as follows: 
 
The social sciences have emerged as a significant force and have professional- 
ized, making it more difficult for philosophers or others without appropriate 
training and expertise in the social sciences to make authoritative claims 
about the nature of the social and political world without being challenged. 
The massive expansion of the ranks of professional social scientists means there 
are now lifelong specialists in the areas that public intellectuals used to 
comment on who are better placed to contest such ‘generalist’ interven- 
tions as uninformed and superficial.331 
 
One may add to this consideration that, reflecting upon the status of phi- 
losophy as a discipline, we are confronted with a curious paradox: 
 
– On the one hand, philosophy represents a ‘timeless’ discipline, to  
the extent that it makes intellectual contributions that claim to pos- 
sess transcendental validity. 
– On the other hand, philosophy constitutes a ‘time-laden’ discipline, 
to the extent that large parts of its intellectual contributions possess, 
at best, a degree of spatiotemporally contingent legitimacy. 
 Insofar as all forms of knowledge production are context-laden, value- 
laden, meaning-laden, perspective-laden, interest-laden, and power- 
laden332, the dream of epistemic transcendentality amounts to little  
more than a pretentious, but ultimately untenable, ambition of scho- 
lastic philosophy. In an age whose social, political, and environmental 
developments are increasingly shaped by the tangible impact of empirical 
research in the natural and social sciences, such a dream constitutes an 
illusory narrative of the past. 
 
b. The Blurring of the Boundaries between Experts and Laypersons 
The second set of changes concerns the epistemic relationship between 
experts and laypersons. Traditionally, it has been assumed that there is a 
profound gap between, on the one hand, the specialized knowledge pro- 
duced by scholars, academics, and professional researchers and, on the 
other hand, the common-sense knowledge employed by ordinary people. 
Yet, in light of the rising ‘high educational levels for larger sections of 
society, the erstwhile distinction between an intellectual elite and the  
rest no longer holds to quite the same extent’333. In postindustrial soci- 
eties, in which—arguably—knowledge, information, and science play a 
greater role than ever before in human history, the disparity between ‘the 
enlighteners’ and ‘the to-be-enlightened’ is less and less pronounced. 
 
With higher education also comes a growing scepticism towards epistemic 
and moral authority, an increasing recognition of the fallibility of knowledge 
and of the existence of alternative perspectives. Speaking from above  and  
at their audience, as authoritative public intellectuals do, is no longer as 
acceptable as it used to be.334 
 
The rise of social and alternative media is experienced as an individu- 
ally and collectively empowering phenomenon by those who do not shy 
away from challenging traditional sources and channels of cognitive, nor- 
mative, and aesthetic authority. To insist on the fact that, in principle, 
every ordinary agent capable of speech and self-justification is equipped 
with purposive reason (Verstand), normative reason (Vernunft), and 
critical reason (Urteilskraft) means to advocate a universalist—that is, 
intersubjectivized—conception of epistemic faculties. While ‘the dialogi- 
cal and democratic potential of the new social media’335 should not be 
overestimated, let alone idealized or fetishized, there is no doubt that the 
rise of ‘glocalized’ grassroots forms of communication has significantly
 contributed to the ‘“democratization” of public intellectual interven- 
tions’336, thereby challenging the legitimacy of traditional—and, to a 
large degree, institutionally consolidated—epistemic hierarchies. 
 
c. The Waning Influence of ‘Philosophical Systems’ 
The third set of changes concerns the fact that ‘there has since been a 
growing disquiet about “philosophical systems” such as Marxism in whose 
name numerous authoritarian regimes have been established and legiti- 
mized’337. Arguably, the rise of postmodernism in the 1990s can be con- 
ceived of as an immediate expression of the crisis of Marxism, which—as 
even its fiercest critics have to admit—constitutes one of the most influ- 
ential metanarratives of modernity.338 In Baert’s view, free-market ide- 
ologies have been ‘equally fanatical about the desirability of its utopian 
vision and equally adamant that an inevitable march of history would 
sweep across the globe’339. Irrespective of what one makes of Francis 
Fukuyama’s announcement of ‘the end of history’340, and regardless of 
how one assesses the failures and contributions, as well as the norma- 
tive defensibility, of major political ideologies of the modern age, one 
does not have to be a postmodernist to concede that, although metanar- 
ratives have far from disappeared, they play a less foundational—and, at 
the same time, a more hybridized—role in most contemporary ‘Western’ 
societies  than they used to in the past.341 As a consequence, in ‘the era   
of micronarratives’342, public intellectuals are less likely to take mono- 
ideological positions than they were in ‘the age of extremes’343. 
 
 
SECOND PART:  
CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON  
BAERT’S ACCOUNT OF INTELLECTUALS 
 
The above reflections should make clear that Baert has produced an 
impressively methodical, insightful, and enlightening account of the vari- 
ous conditions shaping both the constitution and the development of the 
intellectual field in the modern era. His proposal for ‘explaining intellec- 
tuals’344 is of unprecedented quality and of considerable originality, espe- 
cially with the regard to his plea for a paradigm shift from a ‘vocabulary 
of intentions’ to a ‘vocabulary of effects’345. It is equally important, how- 
ever, to grapple with the limitations and shortcomings of Baert’s analysis. 
It is the purpose of the following sections to attend to this critical task. 
 I. Intersectionality 
 
One striking shortcoming of Baert’s approach is that it does not include   
a systematic consideration of the ways in which intellectual life is substan- 
tially shaped by the intersection of central sociological determinants— 
such as class, status, education, social networks, ethnicity, nationality, 
‘race’, language, gender, sexual orientation, age, and ‘ability’. Not all but 
most influential intellectuals of the twentieth and early twenty-first cen- 
turies fall into the following categories: 
 
– class: middle or upper class 
(average or high amount of dominant economic capital) 
→ classism 
– status: privileged 
(high amount of dominant symbolic capital) 
→ protectionism 
– education: well-educated and well-trained 
(high amount of dominant educational capital) 
→ elitism 
– social  networks: well-connected 
(high amount of dominant social capital) 
→ nepotism / favouritism 
– ethnicity: ‘Western’, predominantly European or North American 
(high amount of dominant ethnic capital) 
→ ethnocentrism / Eurocentrism 
– nationality: British, Canadian, US-American, German, French, 
Spanish, or Italian 
(high amount of dominant national capital) 
→ methodological nationalism / national chauvinism 
– ‘race’: white 
 (high amount of dominant ‘racial’ capital) 
→ cultural / institutional racism 
– language:  Anglophone,  Germanophone,  Francophone,  Hispanophone, 
or Italianophone (or a combination of these) 
(high amount of dominant linguistic capital) 
→ linguistic chauvinism 
– gender: male / malestream 
(high amount of dominant gender capital) 
→ cultural / institutional sexism 
– sexual orientation: heterosexual 
(high amount of dominant sexual capital) 
→ heteronormativism 
– age: middle-aged or old-aged 
(high amount of dominant generational capital) 
→ ageism 
– ability: predominantly ‘able’ / ‘abled’ 
(high amount of dominant performative capital) 
→ ableism 
Given the far-reaching significance  of  the  aforementioned  sociologi-  
cal variables, it is crucial not only to examine the role of each of these 
dimensions in shaping the intellectual field, but also to shed light on the 
extent to which their intersectional constitution contributes to the devel- 
opment—that is, success or failure—of intellectual careers. 
 
 
II. (In-) Commensurability 
 
Throughout  his  book,  Baert  seeks  to  argue  for  the  uniqueness  of  
the  case  of  Sartre—notably,  in  terms  of  his  legacy  and  his  mas-    
sive impact within and beyond the intellectual field. Yet, to claim that
 ‘[t]he amount of sustained media attention and his political influence in 
France and abroad has been unrivalled’346 is questionable. The names     
of prominent twentieth-century intellectuals spring to mind: Simone de 
Beauvoir (1908–1986), Michel Foucault (1926–1984), Noam Chomsky 
(1928–), Jürgen Habermas (1929–), Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002), 
Jacques Derrida (1930–2004), Ulrich Beck (1944–2015), Nancy Fraser 
(1947–), Slavoj Žižek (1949–), and Judith Butler (1956–)—to mention 
only a few. Similar to Sartre, they can be regarded as high-ranking and 
world-renowned public intellectuals whose works have had, and con- 
tinue to have, a considerable impact on contemporary social and political 
debates, especially in ‘Western’ societies. 
 
 
III. Interpenetrability 
 
To conceive of ‘the field’ as ‘any system of social relations that has its  
own logic’347 means to miss out on its power-laden dimensions. From       
a Bourdieusian perspective, ‘the field’ constitutes a relationally struc- 
tured realm in which agents—who occupy objectively externalized posi- 
tions and acquire subjectively internalized dispositions—are immersed 
in a constant struggle for access to material and symbolic resources. The 
idiosyncratic logic underlying the reproduction of a field is vital to its 
capacity to distinguish itself from other interactional microcosms within 
the societal macrocosm. Yet, the power-ladenness of a field—that is, the 
extent to which the interactions taking place within it are asymmetrically 
structured and, thus, shaped by unequal access to resources for action— 
is central to the multifaceted ways in which social struggles continue to 
play a pivotal role in the development of human—including intellec- 
tual—affairs.348 
Baert  gives  a  highly  differentiated  account  of the complex historical 
relations hip between the ‘literary field’ and the ‘academic field’. More 
specifically, he argues that, in nineteenth-century France, the cultural 
arena was divided between these two fields.349 One problem with this 
contention is that it portrays both the literary field and the academic field 
as the two principal sub-fields of the cultural field. Natural scientists—but 
also numerous social scientists, as well as scholars working in the human- 
ities, including philosophers—will find it difficult to subscribe to the 
assertion that they are conducting research in the cultural field. While 
Baert is right to state that the literary field and the academic field can be 
interpreted as ‘separate fields, each with its own logic’350, his twin claims
 that ‘[i]t is only in the course of the twentieth century that the two fields 
started to intersect, and [that] few people managed to combine the 
requirements to excel in both fields’351, are problematic. 
In fact, the literary field and the academic field began to intersect in the 
early modern period—if not, long before then. There are manifold exam- 
ples of intellectuals who were—albeit, admittedly, to varying degrees— 
well equipped, and creatively immersed, in both fields: 
 
René Descartes (1596–1650), Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), Gottfried 
Wilhelm   Leibniz   (1646–1716),   François-Marie   Voltaire   (1694–1778), 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1978), Immanuel Kant (1724–1804),  
Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), Johann Wolfgang von Goethe 
(1749–1832), Henri de  Saint-Simon  (1760–1825),  Johann  Gottlieb  
Fichte  (1762–1814),   Alexander von Humboldt  (1769–1859),   Georg W. 
F. Hegel (1770–1831), Karl Marx (1818–1883), and Friedrich Nietzsche 
(1844–1900). 
 
Arguably, this also applies to the aforementioned twentieth-century intel- 
lectuals: 
 
Simone de Beauvoir (1908–1986), Michel Foucault (1926–1984), Noam 
Chomsky   (1928–),   Jürgen Habermas   (1929–),   Pierre Bourdieu   (1930– 
2002),  Jacques  Derrida  (1930–2004),  Ulrich  Beck  (1944–2015),  Nancy 
Fraser (1947–), Slavoj Žižek (1949–), and Judith Butler (1956–). 
 
In various disciplines in the humanities and social sciences (above all, in 
the ‘discursive’ ones, such as literature, philosophy, historiography, soci- 
ology, anthropology, cultural studies, and political science), influential 
scholars need to demonstrate that they are able to draw upon both the 
‘literary field’ and the ‘academic field’, by combining and cross-fertilizing 
the conceptual and methodological tools available in each of them. 
A related conceptual problem arises from the fact that in some sec- 
tions Baert insists upon Sartre’s ability to master the rules of both the 
‘literary field’ and the ‘academic field’352, whereas in other sections he 
draws attention to Sartre’s skilfulness in thriving in both the ‘literary 
field’ and the ‘philosophical field’353. This conceptual inconsistency, how- 
ever, is not insignificant, since the terms ‘academic field’ and ‘philosophi- 
cal field’—insofar as they refer to two different states of affairs—should
 not be used interchangeably. Not every academic is a philosopher, and 
not every philosopher is an academic. 
This conceptual inconsistency put to one side, rather than affirming 
that ‘Sartre’s popularity can be explained mainly by his unprecedented 
ability to stand out in those two genres, using them as complementary 
channels for his ideas, as he managed to compete successfully in both the 
literary and [the] philosophical fields’354, we need to recognize that there 
are numerous examples of intellectuals who have built their careers by 
relying on their capacity to shine in both of these areas, as well as in both 
academic and non-academic spheres of life. 
 
 
IV. Diversity 
 
Overall, one gets the impression that, in Baert’s analytical framework, 
there is little—if any—place for intellectuals from ‘non-traditional’— 
notably, humble or socially deprived—backgrounds. Indeed, on his account, 
it appears almost impossible that people with limited (or at least initially 
limited) material and symbolic resources, especially those from marginal- 
ized sectors of society, stand any realistic chance of converting themselves 
into intellectuals, let alone into prominent public intellectuals. 
For instance, when examining the ‘sharp division between novelists 
and professors’355, Baert contends that ‘[t]he former were often self- 
funded and invariably came from privileged backgrounds, whereas the 
latter went through the meritocratic channels of the École normale’356. 
The Darwinist sense of ‘meritocracy’ underlying the French education 
system is, of course, highly problematic to the degree that, in practice,     
it perpetuates the logic of social privilege and entitlement, even though 
its official rhetoric—which centres around notions of liberté,  égalité,  
and fraternité, based on a canonical belief in the universal rights of all 
members of humanity—suggests otherwise.357 Irrespective of how one 
assesses the relative merits and failures of the French educational system 
(and, for that matter, of other educational systems), the sociologically 
challenging question that poses itself in the context of this inquiry con- 
cerns the extent to which—against all odds—some individuals from non- 
privileged backgrounds are able to gain access to sufficient volume of 
capital (such as cultural, symbolic, and social capital) permitting them to 
convert themselves into serious—and, in exceptional cases, into influen- 
tial public—intellectuals. The fine-grained complexity of Baert’s account 
indicates that he does not deny this possibility.358 Yet, there is little in the
 way of conceptual and empirical room for the rise of successful intellectu- 
als from non-traditional—that is, non-privileged—backgrounds in Baert’s 
theoretical framework. 
More specifically, the issue that needs to be explored, in this respect, 
concerns the question of the degree to which individuals from relatively 
or completely disempowered social groups can convert themselves into 
low- or high-profile intellectuals. What needs to be studied, then, is the 
extent to which it is possible for agents who—at least initially—score low 
on crucial forms of capital (such as economic, symbolic, educational, 
social, ethnic, national, ‘racial’, linguistic, gender-specific, sexual, gen- 
erational, and performative capital) to transform themselves into low-  
or high-profile intellectuals. As critical sociologists, we need to face up   
to the fact that intellectuals who can be described in terms of one (or a 
combination) of the following characteristics are in the minority: 
 
– ‘member of the working class’; 
– ‘member of a lower-status group’; 
– ‘receiver of basic formal education, acquired in a low-income insti- 
tution’; 
– ‘citizen without access to privileged social networks’; 
– ‘member of a non-hegemonic ethnic group’; 
– ‘citizen—or former citizen—of a non-“Western” and developing 
country’; 
– ‘non-white’; 
– ‘speaking and writing in a non-European language’; 
– ‘female’; 
– ‘LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and/or transgender)’; 
– ‘young adult’; 
– ‘mentally and/or physically disabled’. 
 
There is no point in taking this reflection too far. It poses a sociologically 
relevant problem, however, in the sense that it obliges us to scrutinize the 
role that social backgrounds play in the lives and careers of intellectuals. 
 
 
V. (Socio-) Historicity 
 
Baert posits that one of the principal problems with Boschetti’s approach 
is that it tends ‘to ignore the wider socio-political context’359 in which 
intellectuals either manage or fail to thrive. This omission, he maintains,
 ‘makes it difficult for her to explain why the rise of Sartre and existen- 
tialism occurred during this particular period—not before, not after’360. 
Hence, rather than treating ‘the intellectual sphere as a relatively autono- 
mous unity’361, it is vital to examine the ways in which it is shaped by 
multiple ‘socio-political factors outside’362 itself. It would be a methodo- 
logical mistake, then, to follow an ‘individualistic logic’363, which pre- 
vents the critical researcher from accounting for the ‘broader societal 
developments that impinged on the cultural sphere’364 in general and on 
the intellectual sphere in particular. 
Baert may be right to accuse Boschetti of falling short of paying ade- 
quate attention to the idiosyncratic socio-historical conditions in post- 
war France, including their far-reaching implications for the development 
of the intellectual field in the same country. He appears to overlook, 
however, that one of the main objectives of Bourdieusian studies of intel- 
lectuals is to shed light on the socio-historical conditions of production 
under which they operate.365 In fact, Bourdieusian approaches tend to   
be suspicious of scholastic frameworks of analysis366, rejecting them for 
failing to conceive of social actions and social structures in terms of field- 
specific dynamics, let alone in terms of wider historical developments 
and trends. Baert announces that his own approach aims to ‘explain the 
relative solidity of positioning more sociologically’367. It gets hardly any 
more sociological, however, than in Bourdieu’s writings and the accounts 
offered by those who have followed in his footsteps (such as Anna 
Boschetti, Neil Gross, and Randall Collins).368 
 
 
VI. Narrativity 
 
Baert provides a comprehensive and systematic  overview  of  ‘four  of  
the most recurrent narratives’369 explaining the rise of Sartre. While the 
points he makes in this section are remarkably compelling, it is not evi- 
dent which authors actually advocate these four perspectives. In addition 
to failing to spell this out, Baert does not provide any bibliographical refer- 
ences that would permit the reader to locate the textual sources in which 
these positions are being methodically defended. Baert states that ‘there 
are plenty of secondary sources on Sartre that drop tentative hypothe- 
ses as to his success without elaborating or properly defending them’370. 
What remains unclear, however, is not only which particular secondary 
sources make insufficiently substantiated claims concerning Sartre’s influ- 
ence, but also how exactly they fall into the ‘four of the most recurrent
 narratives’371 identified by Baert. Given the centrality of these four 
interpretations of Sartre for the construction of Baert’s own theoreti-    
cal framework, this shortcoming is not insignificant. Even those who are 
sympathetic to Baert’s approach may legitimately object that, in this sec- 
tion, he is dealing with four nameless straw men. 
 
 
VII. Autonomy 
 
Baert asserts that ‘[t]he self-regulatory principle of the intra-intellectual 
world is epitomised by the Humboldtian notion of the university accord- 
ing to which the academic world is largely managed by the academic 
producers themselves’372. Yet, this reflects a misrepresentation of the 
Humboldtian conception of the university. Instead of implicitly por- 
traying Humboldt as a Luhmannian systems theorist373, we need to 
acknowledge that, on his account, universities—far from constituting 
autopoietic systems—fulfil a wider societal function, which consists in 
forming cognitively competent, morally conscientious, and aesthetically 
appreciative individuals, who are capable of contributing to the construc- 
tion of ‘the good society’ on the basis of their purposive, normative, and 
evaluative resources, acquired within a humanistic education system. Of 
course, for Humboldt, the ideal of academic autonomy is crucial to an 
educational apparatus that is not entirely colonized by the administra- 
tive logic of the state and the commodifying logic of the market. Yet, in 
Humboldt’s eyes, educational institutions—at all levels—should be con- 
ceived of as interconnected organs of the collective body called ‘society’. 
Put differently, from a Humboldtian perspective,  there  is  no  Bildung  
des Individuums (education of the individual) without the Bildung der 
Gesellschaft (education of society), and vice versa.374 
 
 
VIII. Heterogeneity 
 
On the face of it, Baert is right to suggest that ‘ideas are more likely to 
spread from the intra- to the public intellectual domain if they are “pack- 
aged” in terms of a coherent intellectual doctrine and “labelled” ’375. Thus, 
in principle, anything that helps to present a set of ideas ‘in a unified 
fashion and as part of a coherent doctrine’376 will contribute to promot- 
ing them in terms of an overarching intellectual programme. We must 
not lose sight of the fact, however, that some currents of thought have 
been extraordinarily successful although—or, perhaps, because—they are
 amorphous and contradictory as well as, to a considerable extent, inter- 
nally fragmented. 
 
– One may examine the ‘major’ political ideologies of modernity: 
anarchism, communism/socialism, liberalism, conservatism, and 
fascism. Arguably, all of them have been significantly shaped by 
intellectual thought, even if we admit that some of their variants— 
especially in the case of right-wing ideologies—tend to be anti-intel- 
lectualist. Moreover, one may scrutinize the ‘sub-major’ political 
ideologies of modernity: for instance, nationalism, feminism, and 
environmentalism. Again, all of them have been profoundly influ- 
enced by intellectual thought. All of these ‘major’ and ‘sub-major’ 
ideologies, however, are internally fragmented.377 
– In order to comprehend the tangible impact of intellectual ideas 
upon the development of modern societies, one may distinguish five 
main types of metanarrative: (1) political metanarratives, (2) philo- 
sophical metanarratives, (3) religious metanarratives, (4) economic 
metanarratives, and (5) cultural metanarratives. All of these types of 
metanarrative are internally fragmented.378 
– One may find several examples in the humanities and social sciences 
that highlight their fragmented nature. An obvious paradigm illus- 
trating this point is ‘postmodernism’, a label with which numerous 
researchers—notably philosophers, social methodologists, sociolo- 
gists, historians, and political scientists—of the late twentieth cen- 
tury are associated, in many cases against their will and as ‘reluctant 
participants’.379 One may consider other intellectual currents within 
the humanities and social sciences: structuralism and poststructural- 
ism, idealism and materialism, constructivism and realism, interpre- 
tivism and positivism—to mention only a few. These traditions of 
thought are internally fragmented, creating manifold ‘sub-schools’ 
and ‘sub-canons’.380 
 
What Baert’s study does not explore are the implications of the follow- 
ing—counterintuitive—insight: paradoxically, the absence of unambigu- 
ous forms of packaging and branding of intellectual ideas may contribute to 
their rise and success, rather than to their demise or failure. Granted, in the 
vast majority of cases, the art of packaging and branding determines the
 survival or extinction of intellectual ideas. Some intellectual ideas are even 
more fascinating and often even more influential, however, when it is dif- 
ficult to pigeonhole them. 
 
 
IX. Imaginary 
 
For Baert, in order for a doctrine ‘to enter the public intellectual 
domain’381, it needs ‘to resonate with recent socio-political experi- 
ences’382. This assumption is problematic insofar as the term  ‘reso-  
nate’ can mean different things to different agents in different contexts. 
Furthermore, we may turn Baert’s contention upside down: in some 
cases, the success of a  paradigm—in  terms  of  its  capacity  to  occupy 
an influential discursive place in the public intellectual domain—may 
depend on its capacity not to resonate with recent socio-political experi- 
ences. For instance, postmodernism has not simply echoed but also dis- 
torted major socio-political experiences made by individual and collective 
agents in the late twentieth century, by portraying the confluence of con- 
sumer capitalism and neoliberalism—owing to the massive post-1989 
legitimacy crisis of Marxism—as ‘the only game in town’.383 
As Baert himself concedes, the important aspects of a narrative are to 
be found not simply in what is being said, but, crucially, in what is not 
being said.384 Thus, a critical reading of intellectual paradigms needs to 
expose their misconceptions, misperceptions, misrepresentations, mis- 
constructions, and misinterpretations as much as the numerous points  
in which they get it right. It is often because of  their  distortive func- 
tions, rather than because of their capacity to provide objective accounts 
of reality, that intellectual paradigms can become prominent, especially 
when taking their audience and readership further away from, rather 
than closer to, what genuinely matters in terms of their day-to-day 
immersion in reality. The distortive functions of intellectual paradigms 
can be just as vital to their capacity to capture their followers’ imagi- 
nation as their purposive, normative, and evaluative potential. In brief, 
intellectual paradigms, and those inventing or propagating them, must 
be, at least partly, distortive in order to be successful, praising their own 
achievements and playing down those of other—above all, rival—cur- 
rents of thought. 
 X. Intellectuality 
 
Baert formulates five hypotheses on the conditions under which ‘ideas 
spread more rapidly’385. One fundamental problem with these hypoth- 
eses, however, derives from the fact that Baert fails to specify what kind 
of ideas he has in mind. Although it should be clear from the textual 
context in which these hypotheses are articulated that he is referring to 
intellectual ideas, his five central statements are, in the current wording, 
ambiguous. To  be precise, the formulations ‘ideas spread more rapidly   
if ’386 (1st and 2nd hypothesis), ‘ideas spread more effectively if ’387 (3rd 
hypothesis), ‘ideas are more likely to spread if ’388 (4th hypothesis), and 
‘ideas will disseminate more effectively if ’389 (5th hypothesis) should 
state explicitly that they are intended to claim validity with respect to 
‘intellectual ideas’. The point is not to be pedantic about the exact phras- 
ing of these hypotheses; rather, the point is to recognize that, without 
this conceptual specification, the five hypotheses formulated by Baert  
are untenable, since they apply mainly—if not, exclusively—to intel- 
lectual ideas, that is, they do not apply to other types of ideas (such as 
ideas based on common sense, on dogmas and traditions of everyday  
life, on religious belief systems, and so forth). Put differently, Baert’s five 
hypotheses, far from being applicable to any kind of ideas, can be empiri- 
cally verified in relation to intellectual ideas only. Given the significance 
of this terminological imprecision, the difference between ‘intellectual 
ideas’ and ‘non-intellectual ideas’ needs to be spelled out. 
 
 
XI. Ideology 
 
Baert is right to suggest that, typically, l’intellectuel is ‘situated on the   
left of the political spectrum’390 and that there is a legitimate tendency   
to regard intellectuals as ‘anti-conformists who distrust le pouvoir’391. 
Even if we share this view, however, we need to acknowledge the fact 
that there are numerous right-wing intellectuals in the public sphere in 
general and in the academic field in particular. Unsurprisingly, they come 
in different forms and emerge in different realms. In principle, they can 
be found in all academic disciplines, although in some disciplines (such  
as sociology, anthropology, and social work) they tend to be more mar- 
ginalized than in others (such as political science, business studies, and 
management studies). 
 The fact that there is hardly any place for right-wing intellectuals in 
Baert’s study makes the explanatory scope of his account more limited 
than it otherwise could have been. The analytical challenges arising from 
this issue can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. How do we explain the striking imbalance between, on the one hand, 
the abundance of left-wing—or, at least, left-leaning—intellectuals 
(broadly conceived of as ‘progressive’ or, in their radical variants, as 
‘revolutionary’) and, on the other hand, the scarcity of right-wing—or, 
at least, right-leaning—intellectuals (broadly conceived of as ‘conserv- 
ative’ or, in their radical variants, as ‘reactionary’)? 
2. Following on from the previous question, is there an inherent ten- 
dency in the intellectual field both to attract and to produce left-wing  
or left-leaning individuals? If so, is this the case because most intellec- 
tuals aim (a) to reflect critically on the constitution of the social world, 
(b) to reject categorically any arbitrary systems of domination, and (c) 
to contribute universally to the betterment of the human condition? 
3. How do we explain, on a case-by-case basis, that some academic 
disciplines are more likely, and others less likely, to attract—or to 
produce—either left-wing / left-leaning or right-wing / right-lean- 
ing intellectuals? In other words, what is it about the ‘epistemic 
spirit’ that appears to make them prone to drawing in thinkers with 
particular sets of ideological credentials? More specifically, it is pos- 
sible to make—seriously tenable—universal claims about tenden- 
cies of ideological preponderance in relation to particular academic 
disciplines? Or, are ideological trends within a discipline, in the 
long run, volatile and unpredictable? 
4. How do we explain, on a case-by-case basis, that some political 
ideologies are more likely, and others less likely, to attract—and, 
indeed, to be theoretically and practically developed by—intellec- 
tuals? What is it about the ‘normative spirit’ that appears to make 
them prone to being founded on a more or less complex intellec- 
tual architecture? More specifically, it is possible to make tenable 
universal claims about tendencies of intellectual preponderance in 
relation to particular ideologies? 
– Typically, left-wing major political ideologies (such as anarchism 
and communism/socialism) tend to be considered ‘intellectual’
 or even ‘intellectualist’, whereas right-wing major political ide- 
ologies (such as conservatism and fascism) tend to be regarded 
as ‘anti-intellectual’ or even ‘anti-intellectualist’. Centre-ground 
major political ideologies (such as liberalism) tend to be con- 
ceived of as ‘intellectually inspired’ without being ‘intellectualist’. 
– The picture gets more complex if one includes ‘sub-major’ political 
ideologies (such as nationalism, feminism, and environmentalism). 
Arguably, all of them possess a strong intellectual component, while 
also comprising a pronounced anti-intellectual outlook insofar as 
they express scepticism towards overly theoreticist (that is, abstract 
and disconnected) ways of relating to, and making sense of, social life. 
The main questions that we face in light of these complexities 
can be synthesized as follows: Are these stereotypical ways of 
conceptualizing the link between political ideologies and intel- 
lectual thought, to a significant extent, justified? If so, how can 
these differences be explained? 
5. Where do we draw the line between ‘intellectual’ and ‘non-intellec- 
tual’ thoughts, ideas, and principles? The answer to this query is 
crucial, as it will determine how we respond to the preceding ques- 
tions. Only insofar as we are explicit about the qualitative specific- 
ity of intellectual modes of relating, and attributing meaning, to the 
world will we be in a position to make insightful assertions about 
the role of intellectuals with respect to the aforementioned ten- 
sions: (a) ‘left’ versus ‘right’, (b) ‘emancipation’ versus ‘domination’, 
(c) ‘academic commitment’ versus ‘political commitment’, (d) ‘intel- 
lectual ideologies’ versus ‘non-intellectual ideologies’, and—more 
generally—(e) ‘intellectual’ versus ‘non-intellectual’.392 
 
 
XII. Theory 
 
Baert posits that ‘studies of intellectuals are often insufficiently theo- 
rized’393 and that, more specifically, ‘[o]ne tends to associate the lack of 
an explicit theoretical underpinning more with intellectual history than 
with sociology of intellectuals’394. The reason for this, he contends, is that, 
unlike the latter, ‘the former is supposed to be more preoccupied with 
deciphering the context and depicting the intellectual moves within it than 
with broader theoretical considerations as such’395. As a closer look at 
these two research traditions reveals, however, numerous inquiries within
 the area of intellectual history, although some of them are indeed rather 
descriptive, tend to examine the genealogy of ideas in a conceptually 
sophisticated and theoretically informed fashion.396 In fact, as Baert con- 
cedes, ‘even more sociologically inclined authors do not always elaborate 
on their theoretical stance’397. 
What is more significant, however, is that sociological accounts of 
intellectuals—while they may draw upon theoretical frameworks to 
explain or to interpret developments in the intellectual field—in many 
cases fail to engage with the substance of the contributions made by the 
figures whose lives they study. For example, in relation to a different 
issue, Baert mentions Bourdieu’s analysis of Heidegger.398 The irony of 
Bourdieu’s account of Heidegger may be described as follows: although  
it provides useful field-theoretic tools to shed light on Heidegger’s 
position within the academic field in mid-twentieth century Germany, 
Bourdieu’s  analysis  lacks  agenuine  engagement  with  the  concep-   
tual depth, let alone with the major philosophical contributions, of his 
oeuvre. In short, both in intellectual history and in the sociology of intel- 
lectuals one finds manifold investigations that—since they suffer from  
an ‘empiricist’ or a ‘descriptivist’ bias—are not sufficiently informed, let 
alone guided, by theoretical considerations concerning either the wider 
socio-historical circumstances in which ideas develop or the substance of 
the ideas themselves (or a combination of these two deficits of critical 
analysis). 
 
 
XIII. Fallacy 
 
Baert identifies ‘five recurring problems’399 that, in his view, under- 
mine the quality of existing studies of intellectuals: the empiricist bias, 
the motivational bias, the structural fallacy, the authenticity bias, and the 
stability bias.400 Two issues immediately spring to mind, however, when 
reflecting on the validity of Baert’s conceptualization of these limitations. 
First, it is not clear why Baert characterizes four out of five issues as 
forms of ‘bias’401 and only one of  them  as  a  ‘fallacy’402.  The  point  is 
not to make a case for the rigid view that an argument can be coher- 
ent only to the extent that it is terminologically consistent—that is, in 
this case, semantically homological. Rather, the point is to acknowl- 
edge not only that the terms ‘bias’ and ‘fallacy’ describe two very dif- 
ferent states of affairs, but also that the latter has much more profound 
implications for the validity of a particular explanatory account than
 the former. If an argument or approach is permeated by a specific type  
of ‘bias’, its validity is not completely undermined. If, by contrast, an 
argument or approach suffers from a ‘fallacy’, its validity can hardly be 
sustained. The question that poses itself in this regard is why we should 
assume that Baert’s third issue—the ‘structural’ one—deserves to be 
described as a fallacy, whereas the other four issues do not. The reader is 
left in the dark as to why this is the case. It seems to me that, in relation 
to the aforementioned ‘five recurring problems’403, Baert’s terminologi- 
cal choice merits a few words of explanation. 
Second, it is far from evident why Baert characterizes only one out     
of five issues as a form of ‘ism’ (‘empiricist’)404—that is, with a suffix 
denoting a doctrine—, whereas the other issues are described with stand- 
ard adjectives (‘motivational’ and ‘structural’)405 and standard nouns 
(‘authenticity’ and ‘stability’)406. Given that,  arguably,  every  form  of  
bias contains a motivational component (especially in the development 
of an explanatory approach), and given that every fallacy comprises vari- 
ous structural dimensions (particularly within a sociological account con- 
cerned with the interplay between different social forces), it would have 
been more appropriate to characterize these sources of bias as ‘motiva- 
tionalist’ and ‘structuralist’, respectively. The reader is not given the 
luxury of clarification concerning this conceptual differentiation. Once 
again, it would have been useful if this terminological incongruity had 
been accompanied by a brief elucidation. 
 
 
XIV. Sociality 
 
When scrutinizing what he calls the ‘structural fallacy’407, Baert states 
that this form of misjudgement consists in attempting ‘to explain indi- 
vidual decisions by sociological determinants’408. Drawing upon 
Durkheim’s Rules of Sociological Method409, he goes on to affirm that, 
according to the conceptual framework proposed in this ground-break- 
ing study, ‘social facts ought to be explained and predicted by other social 
facts’410 and that, crucially, such a ‘sociological explanation did not extend 
to individual facts’411. This contention is problematic for at least two 
reasons. 
 
1. Baert does not provide definitions of the concepts ‘social facts’ and 
‘individual facts’, which would have been useful to understand the 
exact differences between these two states of affairs. 
 2. Baert seems to overlook one of the main objectives underlying 
Durkheim’s analysis, which consists in demonstrating that seem- 
ingly ‘individual facts’ (such as suicide) and seemingly ‘individual 
acts’ (such as committing suicide) actually constitute ‘social facts’ 
and ‘social acts’ to the extent that they are profoundly shaped by 
social forces. 
 
The following remark, which he makes in this context, is equally mislead- 
ing: ‘while he [Durkheim] thought that levels of societal integration and 
regulations explain and predict suicide patterns, he realized that they do 
not account effectively for an individual suicide’412. As Durkheimian 
scholars may object, the opposite is the case. The principal purpose of 
Durkheim’s four-dimensional typologization of suicide—(1) ‘egoistic sui- 
cide’, (2) ‘altruistic suicide’, (3) ‘anomic suicide’, and (4) ‘fatalistic sui- 
cide’—is to illustrate the extent to which human acts that, at first glance, 
appear to have a merely individual motivational and behavioural structure 
are, as a thorough sociological examination reveals, profoundly shaped by 
social (notably, cultural, political, economic, and historical) forces.413 
Hence, when criticizing prominent sociological accounts—as the ones 
developed by Perry Anderson and Neil Gross414—for ‘conflating socio- 
logical and individual explanations’415, Baert is right to be wary of ‘sociol- 
ogistic’ attempts to explain almost everything—including an intellectual’s 
preference for a particular doctrine—in merely sociological terms. Yet, to 
the extent that, as Durkheimians convincingly insist, all aspects of human 
existence—including those that may appear to be ‘subjectively’, or even 
‘biologically’, determined—are influenced by social forces, it is a meth- 
odological mistake to create a conceptual opposition between ‘individual 
facts’ and ‘social facts’. The most sensible way forward, then, is to make   
a case for a multifactorial form of analysis, which—while permitting the 
researcher to prioritize some causal factors over others in a context-sen- 
sitive fashion—avoids falling into the trap of providing simplistic explana- 
tions that reduce the complexity of the interplay between social actions 
and social structures to one overriding dimension. 
 
 
XV. Authenticity 
 
In the context of examining what he characterizes as the ‘authenticity 
bias’416, Baert insists that ‘intellectuals operate within competitive are- 
nas, struggling over symbolic and institutional recognition and scarce
 financial resources’417. It appears that, in this respect, intellectuals do not 
have much of a choice: either they are ‘in’ by accepting ‘the rules of the 
game’, or they are ‘out’ by rejecting ‘the rules of the game’ (in which   
case, for them, there is no game—that is, no game within the intellectual 
field). For Baert, intellectual interventions constitute ‘an integral part of 
this power struggle’418, implying that it would be an interpretive mistake 
to regard their creative contributions as ‘an expression of some deeper 
self’419. It follows that, within the analytical parameters set by Baert’s 
positionist framework, the notion that it is ‘essential to establish a critical 
distance vis-à-vis the way in which most intellectuals portray themselves 
to their audience’420 can be considered a categorical methodological 
imperative. 
This proposition reflects not only a valid point in relation to the 
ambition to develop a sociologically reflexive programme for the study  
of intellectuals but also an empowering component of a critical posture 
that prevents researchers from making the epistemological mistake of 
taking the statements made by their objects of examination at face value. 
What this methodological strategy tends to underestimate, however, is 
the extent to which intellectuals are in a position to bypass the struggles 
to which they are exposed, and in which they participate, in their field    
of competition. To put it bluntly, some intellectuals are more, and some 
intellectuals are less, affected by these struggles than others. To be sure, 
this is not a Mannheim-inspired plea for a ‘universe of free-floating intel- 
lectuals’.421 Rather, this is to recognize that intellectuals can challenge 
and, in some cases, subvert the rigid and constraining boundaries of 
field-specific realities. Since they are usually equipped with powerful con- 
ceptual and methodological tools, by means of which they can question 
the apparent givenness of reality, intellectuals possess both the theoretical 
capacity to create their own critical imaginaries and the practical capac- 
ity to construct their own experiential spheres of objectivity, normativity, 
and subjectivity. 
In short, a major sociological challenge consists in shedding light on 
the following paradox: 
 
– On the one hand, intellectuals, in order to position themselves in 
relation to other intellectuals in particular and to other members of 
society in general, are obliged to obey, if not to promote, ‘the rules  
of the game’ by entering into a field-specific struggle over access to 
material and symbolic resources. 
 – On the other hand, intellectuals, in order to distinguish themselves 
from other intellectuals in particular and from other members of 
society in general, are able to bypass, if not to undermine, ‘the rules 
of the game’ by generating both theoretical and practical spheres of 
retreat, allowing them to escape, at least to some degree, the con- 
straining logic of field-specific mechanisms of material and symbolic 
profit-driven reproduction, ranking, and competition. 
 
Baert’s analysis provides astute reflections on the former, while offering 
little in the way of insightful contemplations on the latter. 
 
 
XVI. (In-) Determinacy 
 
Undoubtedly, it is possible to gather substantial textual evidence to sup- 
port the view that it is appropriate to describe Bourdieu as a ‘determin- 
ist’.422 When doing so, however, one needs to recognize that a close 
reading of Bourdieu’s writings demonstrates that his conception of 
human action in particular and his conception of society in general are  
far more complex than such a reductive interpretation may suggest.423 In 
fact, in addition to the first contention that Bourdieu was a determinist 
and to the second  contention  that  Bourdieu was not a determinist,  one 
is confronted with the third contention that Bourdieu was not sufficiently 
determinist, to which, of course, one may wish to oppose the fourth con- 
tention that Bourdieu was not sufficiently anti-determinist.424 
Irrespective of which of these perspectives one may wish to endorse, 
Baert’s interpretation of Bourdieusian analysis is weakened by the fact 
that, without further reflection, the former tends to associate the latter 
with sociological determinism. Surely, Baert is right to reject ‘the assump- 
tion that early formation makes for fixity of somebody’s subsequent 
intellectual trajectory’425. The problem with this statement, however, is 
that—although some Bourdieu-inspired researchers, such as Gross, may 
support this arguably reductive view—it is untenable to accuse Bourdieu 
himself of this kind of crude sociological determinism. In  Gross’s  
defence, one may point out that hardly anyone would seriously claim that 
an individual’s early formation makes for ‘fixity’ of his or her subsequent 
trajectory (intellectually or otherwise defined). 
Baert appears to make a case for a more balanced account when 
stating  that  ‘Bourdieu  and  Gross  are  right  in  so  far  as  intellectu-   
als’ orientations remain relatively stable’426, which is illustrated in the
 fact that most of them ‘do not change their stance constantly’427. Yet,     
his hope that positioning theory can ‘provide a more convincing expla- 
nation’428 is based on shaky foundations to the extent that it is moti- 
vated by the misleading assumption that rival approaches—notably, 
Bourdieu’s ‘theory of practice’429 and Gross’s application of this frame- 
work to the study of intellectuals—are thoroughly and unambiguously 
deterministic. 
To be clear, there is no point in denying that Bourdieusian forms of 
social analysis are pervaded by deterministic tendencies.430 It would be 
misleading not to acknowledge, however, that Bourdieu as well as many 
of his followers rightly insist on the generative potential permeating the 
objective, normative, and subjective dimensions of human existence.431 
Interestingly, Bourdieu himself was a striking example of this generative 
potential, since his own habitus changed dramatically throughout his life, 
converting him into a self-reflexive protagonist of upward social mobil- 
ity.432 One may wish to focus on the dispositions one acquires through 
one’s habitus, on the positions one occupies in different social fields, or 
on the material and symbolic resources one accumulates by means of 
different forms of capital. Irrespective of one’s primary analytical con- 
cern, to the extent that all of these sociological variables are subject to 
high degrees of malleability, adaptability, and convertibility, they reflect 
the generative potential that is built into social actions in particular and 
human existence in general. Baert’s account suffers from a lack of atten- 
tion to the role of this generative potential in shaping the lives of, and 
relations between, intellectuals. 
 
 
XVII. Performativity 
 
Baert draws an interesting analogy between ‘language’ and ‘intellectual 
interventions’.433 To be exact, it appears that the ‘performative turn’ can 
be examined in comparative terms on two levels: 
 
– On the one hand, it has been undertaken in linguistics by virtue of 
pragmatist approaches based on speech-act theory, which influenced 
the effort to reformulate critical theory in communication-theo- 
retic terms (Jürgen Habermas)434 as well as the attempt to redefine 
the role of the philosopher in anti-foundationalist terms (Richard 
Rorty)435. 
 – On the other hand, it may be pursued in the sociology of intel- 
lectuals, as proposed by Baert, in order to shed light on the ways    
in which thinkers, by virtue of their scholarly interventions, not 
only reflect but also act upon the world by which they are sur- 
rounded, in which they are embedded, and to which they are 
connected. 
 
The pragmatist rationale behind this analogy, then, can be described as 
follows: just as ‘words, rather than representing or mirroring the external 
world, accomplish things’436, so do intellectual interventions. Far from 
simply describing, analysing, interpreting, explaining, or assessing par- 
ticular aspects of social reality, intellectual interventions do things—that 
is, they act upon, and in relation to, the world. 
This analogy, however, is problematic for the following reason: while 
we may regard both language and intellectual interventions as part of   
the symbolically constructed superstructure of society, the former consti- 
tutes an integral and foundational element of everyday life, whereas the 
latter can be seen as a potentially significant, yet ultimately dispensable, 
aspect of advanced civilizations. To use a Wittgensteinian metaphor, both 
language games and intellectual games are embedded  in  field-specific 
life forms. Yet, whereas the former play a pivotal role, the latter serve a 
rather peripheral function, in the construction of symbolically mediated 
modes of existence—even in societies in which intellectual contributions 
enjoy high degrees of appreciation and recognition. 
In order to illustrate the centrality of this point, it may be useful to 
consider the distinction between ‘foundational field’, ‘contingent field’, 
and ‘ephemeral field’: 
 
(i) A foundational field constitutes a civilizational ensemble of relationally 
structured conditions the existence of which is necessary for the emergence 
of social order. (ii) A contingent field represents a societal ensemble of rela- 
tionally structured conditions the existence of which is possible within the 
emergence of social order. (iii) An ephemeral field stands for an interac- 
tional ensemble of relationally structured conditions the existence of which 
is largely irrelevant to the emergence of social order.437 
 
The analogy between linguistic forms and intellectual forms is valid only 
to the extent that we recognize the following: the former constitute a
 foundational field, whereas the latter constitute a contingent field. In 
brief, human society is inconceivable without language, while it is con- 
ceivable without intellectuals. 
 
 
XVIII. Positionality 
 
It is surprising, and equally disappointing, that, despite the central place 
that this notion occupies within his analysis, Baert provides a remarkably 
vague, and somewhat dissatisfying, definition of the concept of ‘position- 
ing’438, which reads as follows: 
 
The key notion that captures this activity is ‘positioning’. This indicates the 
process by which certain features are attributed to an individual or a group 
or some other entity.439 
 
This statement is problematic for a number of reasons: 
 
1. Since it defines ‘positioning’ in the passive voice (‘the process by 
which certain features are attributed to an individual or a group   
or some other entity’), ‘positioning’ is erroneously portrayed as a 
process that is exclusively determined by exogenous agents, that is, 
as a process of which the positioning subject itself is not in charge. 
2. Since, in addition to defining ‘positioning’ in the passive voice, it 
does not specify who the hidden subject of the action is (‘the pro- 
cess by which certain features are attributed [by whom?] to an indi- 
vidual or a group or some other entity’), ‘positioning’ is mistakenly 
described as a process in which it is not clear who the exogenous 
agents are that are, presumably, in charge of this dynamic. 
3. The aforementioned definition fails to capture the fact that ‘positioning’ 
constitutes a multifaceted process based on (a) relationality, (b) reciproc- 
ity, (c) reconstructability, (d) renormalizability, and (e) recognizability.440 
a. ‘Positioning’ is possible only in terms of relations established 
between positioned and positioning subjects, that is, as a process 
that is created by socially interconnected agents. A positioning sub- 
ject exists with—that is, by relating to—other positioning subjects. 
b. ‘Positioning’ is possible only in terms of a minimal degree of rec- 
iprocity established between positioned and positioning subjects, 
 that is, as a process that depends on the interlocking of actions 
and reactions. A positioning subject exists through—that is, by 
interacting with and reacting to—other positioning subjects. 
c. ‘Positioning’ is possible only in terms of a minimal degree of 
reconstructability established between positioned and posi- 
tioning subjects, that is, as a process that involves  the  con-  
stant rebuilding of social relations. A positioning subject exists 
beyond—that is, by inventing and reinventing its relation to— 
other positioning subjects. 
d. ‘Positioning’ is possible only in terms of a minimal degree of 
renormalizability established between positioned and position- 
ing subjects, that is, as a process in which the meanings and 
values attributed to behavioural, ideological, and institutional 
patterns of social life—which manifest themselves in the real   
or imagined positions that human agents occupy in the social 
space—are incessantly being negotiated and renegotiated. A 
positioning subject exists about—that is, by attaching meanings 
and values to—other positioning subjects. 
e. ‘Positioning’ is possible only in terms of a minimal degree of 
recognizability established between positioned and positioning 
subjects, that is, as a process that evolves in the form of a daily 
struggle for recognition. A positioning subject exists within—that 
is, by seeking acknowledgment from—other positioning subjects. 
 
In short, the existence of a positioning subject is conceivable only 
as a social constellation that unfolds with, through, beyond, about, 
and within the existence of other positioning subjects.441 
 
 
XIX. Multipositionality 
 
Baert convincingly distinguishes between different types of positioning. 
More specifically, he claims that ‘[p]ositioning can take two ideal-typical 
forms’442: (1) intellectual positioning and (2) politico-ethical positioning. 
The former ‘locates the agent primarily within the intellectual realm’443, 
the key currency of success being ‘originality or intellectual power’444. 
The latter requires agents to take ‘a broader political or ethical stance 
which surpasses the narrow confines of the intellectual sphere’445,
 implying that the principal challenge consists in defending a coherent 
stance in relation to the normative constitution of particular sets of social 
arrangements. Baert is right to suggest that, ‘[i]n practice, intellectual 
positioning and political-ethical positioning tend to be intertwined’446. 
The fact that, in many cases, it is far from obvious to what extent they  
can be disentangled may indicate that they are intimately interrelated: it 
is difficult to advocate a coherent and well-founded political-ethical posi- 
tion without drawing on intellectual thought, just as it is hard to endorse 
a timely and cutting-edge intellectual position without taking into 
account political-ethical considerations. 
What is surprising, however, is that Baert explicitly limits his analytical 
framework to the aforementioned types of positioning. Arguably, there are 
many other—significant—forms of positioning that are crucially related to, if 
not closely interwoven with, intellectual positioning. Indeed, one may go 
a step further by contending the following: to the degree that intellectual 
positioning always takes place against a particular disciplinary background, 
it is possible to identify a large variety of intellectual forms of positioning. 
 
– Particularly important, in this respect, are intellectual forms of posi- 
tioning in key areas of philosophical inquiry: epistemology (‘the 
nature of knowledge’), ontology (‘the nature of being’), logic (‘the 
nature of argument’), ethics (‘the nature of morality’), and aesthet- 
ics (‘the nature of art, beauty, and taste’). 
– No less significant in this regard are intellectual forms of positioning 
in key areas of social-scientific inquiry: anthropology, criminology, 
communication studies, economics, educational studies, geography, 
political science, psychology, and sociology. 
– To the previous list, one may add intellectual forms of positioning  
in key areas of the humanities: ancient and modern languages, lit- 
erature, visual arts, performing arts, musicology, religious studies, 
archaeology, classical studies, law, semiotics, linguistics, history and 
historiography, and—as previously mentioned—philosophy. 
– Finally, it is not trivial that intellectual forms of positioning take 
place, to an increasing extent, in key areas of natural-scientific 
inquiry: astronomy, biology, chemistry, earth science, and physics. 
 
To be sure, this is not to deny the socio-historical significance of intel- 
lectual positioning and political-ethical positioning. This is to suggest,
 however, that there are numerous additional noteworthy forms of posi- 
tioning that occupy a central place in the intellectual field. Of course, the 
importance attached to particular forms of positioning is spatiotempo- 
rally contingent. A sociological account of intellectual positioning that 
fails to consider, let alone to explain, the multitude of forms of position- 
ing that shape the intellectual field, however, falls short of doing justice 
to the complexity permeating the wide-ranging and eclectic production of 
ideas, knowledge, and discourses in advanced societies. 
 
 
XX. Teams 
 
Reflecting upon the unfolding of intellectual life, Baert insists upon the 
centrality of ‘teams’, which he distinguishes from ‘networks’. More spe- 
cifically, he claims that the former are narrower than the latter in that 
their members ‘actively cooperate in positioning themselves’447. Within the 
behavioural and ideological—as well as, in some cases, institutional— 
framework of a ‘team’, it is common that intellectual groups start to 
develop in terms of ‘schools’ or ‘research programmes’, ‘often using a label 
which makes their work and agenda immediately recognizable’448. 
When assessing the validity of the concept of ‘team’ in the context      
of the intellectual field, however, we are confronted with a number of 
issues. 
 
1. Arguably, not every intellectual has a ‘team’—at least not in the 
sense of a collaborative network of human resources upon which 
an agent can rely when seeking to acquire, or to consolidate, a 
materially and/or symbolically empowering position in the intel- 
lectual field. Surely, one may object that, at least in the long run, 
intellectuals—including those that seem to flourish in rather iso- 
lated and atomized ways—cannot have a significant impact upon 
paradigmatic developments in any social field unless they make 
allies with members of a particular ‘team’ or start building their 
own ‘team’ from scratch. Yet, it would be an interesting research 
project in itself to scrutinize the unusual cases of ‘solitary intel- 
lectuals’ who manage to set the agenda within a specific area of 
investigation or engagement, but, at least initially, without being 
members of a clearly identifiable ‘team’. There does not appear to 
be much—if any—room for the ‘solitary intellectual’ within Baert’s 
explanatory framework. 
 2. Another crucial issue concerns the question of what happens when 
an intellectual—consciously or unconsciously, explicitly or implic- 
itly, deliberately or unwittingly—joins more than one team at the 
same time. To be clear, team identity and team membership can be 
defined on several levels: 
• in ‘major/classical ideological’ terms (e.g. anarchist, 
communist/socialist, liberal, conservative, or fascist); 
• in ‘sub-major ideological’ terms (e.g. nationalist, feminist, envi- 
ronmentalist, etc.); 
• in disciplinary terms (e.g. anthropology, classics, communication 
studies, cultural studies, economics, historiography, human geog- 
raphy, law, linguistics, literary studies, musicology, philosophy, 
political science, psychology, religious studies, sociology, etc.); 
• in paradigmatic terms (e.g. structuralism or poststructuralism, 
idealism or materialism, constructivism or realism, interpretivism 
or positivism, etc.); 
• in institutional terms (e.g. research centre, department, school, 
faculty, university, etc.); 
• in linguistic terms (e.g. Anglophone, Germanophone, 
Francophone, Hispanophone, Italianophone, etc.); 
• in national terms (e.g. British, German, French, Spanish, Italian, etc.); 
• in generational terms (e.g. adult, middle-aged, old-aged; e.g. par- 
ticularly productive in the sixties, seventies, eighties, etc.); 
• in personal terms (e.g. friendships, social circles, etc.). 
In practice, team identity and team membership are defined in 
terms of a combination of the aforementioned (and various other) 
factors. In all cases, however, team members need at least one cen- 
tral common denominator on which to form a collective identity, 
spirit, and project. In light of the above, we are confronted with 
various important sociological questions, such as the following: 
a. What are the practical and theoretical implications of the fact 
that an intellectual can be a member of more than one ‘team’? 
b. Is there a limit as to the number of ‘teams’ of which an intellec- 
tual can be a member? 
c. Who or what decides which of the various teams to which an 
intellectual may belong will be the crucial one in defining his or 
her relative success, or failure, within the field of intellectuals? 
 3. Another key issue concerns the question of what defines member- 
ship within a team. More specifically, it is far from evident to what 
degree team membership is (a) objectively, (b) normatively, and/or 
(c) subjectively constituted. The sociological challenge, then, consists 
in exploring whether the criteria that determine team membership 
are primarily objective, normative, or subjective (or a combination of 
these elements). 
a. To the extent that team membership criteria are objective, they 
are conceptually representable, methodologically measurable, 
and empirically verifiable—irrespective of normative standards 
and/or subjective perceptions. 
b. To the extent that team membership criteria are normative, they 
are relationally malleable, historically variable, and socially arbi- 
trary—irrespective of objective indicators and/or subjective per- 
ceptions. 
c. To the extent that team membership criteria are subjective, they 
are psychologically projectable, personally interpretable, and 
individually adjustable—irrespective of objective indicators or 
normative standards. 
To the extent that the criteria that determine team membership are 
defined by a combination of these factors (a/b/c), there is no clear 
way of delineating it.449 
The problem of identifying reliable criteria that permit us to define 
team membership has serious conceptual, methodological, and 
empirical implications: 
 
• On the conceptual level, it demonstrates that it is far from 
straightforward to propose a sound explanatory framework for 
the theoretically informed understanding of intellectuals. 
• On the methodological level, it illustrates that it is far from simple 
to develop a procedurally rigorous research strategy for the prac- 
tically oriented study of intellectuals. 
• On  the  empirical level, it  shows that it  is  far  from clear how to 
paint an  accurate  picture  of  the  multiple  facets  shaping the 
contents, processes, practices, and stakes—as well as the forms, 
configurations, structures, and boundaries—of intellectual 
life.450 
  
XXI. Cooperative Individuality 
 
Baert rightly draws attention to the paradoxical relationship between two 
fundamental dynamics shaping the development of the intellectual field: 
cooperation and individualization.451 In this respect, he makes the fol- 
lowing claim: 
 
In general, the more secure and established one’s position, the less one 
needs to rely on teamwork and the more likely one will press for intellec- 
tual individualization.452 
 
It would have been interesting, however, to consider empirical or hypo- 
thetical counterexamples that contradict this tendency. The importance of 
this task is due to the fact that, for some intellectuals, the opposite may 
be true: the more secure and established they are in the field, the more they 
depend not only on the continuous recognition by, but also on the continuous 
cooperation with, their fellow intellectuals. Without regular recognition  
by their peers, even the most established intellectuals—unless they have 
already reached the status of a ‘classic’ in their field—may find it difficult 
not to disappear from the radar. 
Another critical comment in relation to this point highlights the fact 
that cooperation and individualization—and, indeed, collaboration and 
competition—constitute two contradictory processes of any social field. 
In other words, the tension-laden interplay between socializing and indi- 
vidualizing, as well as between collaborative and competitive, processes 
does not represent a unique feature of the field of intellectuals. The 
sociologically more interesting question, however, concerns the extent  
to which the dynamic between these two tendencies varies between dif- 
ferent social fields and why this is the case. (For instance, in some social 
fields, one of the two tendencies may be preponderant, that is, the 
emphasis may be placed on collaboration, rather than on competition,   
or vice versa.) The aforementioned distinction between (1) ‘foundational 
fields’, (2) ‘contingent fields’, and (3) ‘ephemeral fields’453 may be use-  
ful in this regard: different social fields possess different degrees of coop- 
eration and individualization, as well as of collaboration and competition, 
depending on the underlying logic of their respective functioning. The 
more vital the existence of a particular field is to the constitution of soci- 
ety, the more profoundly the interactional dynamics of the former impact 
upon the small- and large-scale developments of the latter. 
  
XXII. Credibility 
 
Baert affirms that ‘radical repositioning is rarely attained without loss of 
credibility’454. It appears that there are two main reasons for this: 
 
– During or after an act of ‘radical repositioning’, an intellectual has  
to provide a strong justification for his or her shift in perspective.  
As mentioned in one of the preceding sections, this may turn out    
to be tricky—or even impossible—if an intellectual decides to shift 
towards a position that is—at least at first glance—diametrically 
opposed to the position that he or she previously advocated. 
– After an act of ‘radical repositioning’, an intellectual’s followers have 
to decide whether or not they wish to continue supporting him or 
her (either in spite of or because of his or her new stance). Just as the 
intellectual protagonist will have to provide sound justifications for 
his or her shift in perspective, so do those who openly subscribe to 
his or her position if they opt to continue endorsing, and looking   
up to, their leading figure. 
 
Baert’s claim concerning the nexus between (re-)positioning and cred- 
ibility may be challenged, however, by turning it upside down: in many 
cases, ‘radical repositioning’ has made intellectuals more, rather than less, 
credible. As spelled out in one of the previous sections, in the history and 
sociology of intellectual thought, it is common to distinguish between an 
‘early’ and a ‘late’ phase when trying to make sense of the contributions 
made by a particular thinker. Famous examples include Karl Marx and 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, but also—more recently—Theodor W. Adorno, 
Jürgen Habermas, Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, and Luc Boltanski. 
To the extent that being an intellectual requires being immersed in a 
horizon of constantly shifting relations, expectations, and positions, ‘radi- 
cal repositioning’ constitutes an integral element of what it means to be an 
intellectual. As Baert rightly states, ‘radical repositioning’ can trigger a loss 
of credibility. As Baert fails to acknowledge, however, ‘radical reposition- 
ing’ can also allow for an increase in credibility—especially if and where a 
fundamental change in direction represents the only option an intellectual 
has to take on board both his or her supporters’ and his or her adversaries’ 
criticisms, thereby demonstrating that he or she, instead of sticking dog- 
matically to one position, is willing to revise his or her viewpoints and to 
adjust them in a timely, constructive, and dialogical fashion.455 
  
XXIII. (In-) Security 
 
Based on his remarks on processes of ‘radical repositioning’, Baert takes 
his argument a step further, as expressed in the following—previously 
quoted—statement: 
 
The more the intellectual is known, the more likely the repositioning will 
have to be accounted for. In sum, repositioning entails reputational risks. 
Both factors—the costs and the reputational risks—explain why repositioning 
tends to be found among either firmly established intellectuals, such as ten- 
ured academics, or those who are just starting off and have not yet publicly 
cemented their position.456 
 
Effectively, Baert distinguishes between ‘established intellectuals’ and 
‘non-established intellectuals’. In most cases, the former enjoy a consider- 
able degree of institutional, financial, and reputational security. By con- 
trast, the latter—especially if they are newcomers—tend to occupy rather 
precarious positions within the intellectual field, characterized by a sig- 
nificant level of institutional, financial, and reputational insecurity. 
For all its merits and perceptiveness, the previous distinction is prob- 
lematic for at least two reasons. 
 
1. One key problem with this binary distinction is that it seems to 
imply that, in terms of success measurement, the separation 
between ‘established’ and ‘non-established’, in addition to rep- 
resenting the major dividing line, is all there is in the intellectual 
field. In reality, however, the picture is much more complex, for 
there are numerous individual and collective agents in the intellec- 
tual field that do not fit any of these two categories—that is, those 
who are neither ‘established’ nor ‘non-established’, but who are 
situated somewhere between these two positions. 
2. Another noteworthy problem with this binary distinction is that it 
fails to do justice to the qualitative difference between acts of ‘repo- 
sitioning’ undertaken by ‘established’ intellectuals and acts of ‘reposi- 
tioning’ carried out by ‘non-established’ intellectuals—not to mention 
those who are situated somewhere between these two positions. For 
instance, when examining these two (or, possibly, three) groups on 
the basis of empirical data, ‘repositioning’ processes may appear rad- 
ical in some cases and moderate in others. Furthermore, agents in
 one of these two (or three) groups may have very different motives 
for undertaking these repositioning processes—partly, because they 
have diverging interests; partly because they have different back- 
grounds; and, partly, because they have diverse trajectories. In this 
respect, the sociological challenge consists in shedding light on the 
question of whether or not it is possible to identify group-specific 
patterns of repositioning within the intellectual field. 
 
 
XXIV. Epistemocracy 
 
Baert appears to be suggesting that the epistemic disparity between experts 
and laypersons has been narrowing in recent decades. Arguably, contempo- 
rary societal developments have undermined the traditional gap between, 
on the one hand, the specialized knowledge produced by scholars, aca- 
demics, and professional researchers and, on the other hand, the com- 
mon-sense knowledge employed by ordinary people. 
There are, according to Baert’s analysis, various reasons for this sig- 
nificant change. 
 
1. The rising ‘high educational levels for larger sections of society’457 
have contributed to the fact that ‘the erstwhile distinction between 
an intellectual elite and the rest no longer holds to quite the same 
extent’458. 
2. Due to higher levels of education for larger sections of  society, 
there has been ‘a growing scepticism towards epistemic and moral 
authority, an increasing recognition of the fallibility of knowledge 
and of the existence of alternative perspectives’459. As a consequence, 
it is considered less and less appropriate for intellectuals to engage 
in patronizing processes based on ‘[s]peaking from above and at 
their audience’460, instead of speaking from below and with their 
audience. 
3. Since the economies of advanced postindustrial formations are 
centred around knowledge, information, and science, both the 
production and the exchange of epistemic resources have been 
increasingly ‘democratized’. 
4. In the ‘digital age’461, the rise of social and alternative media has 
substantially contributed to the democratization of access to, and 
exchange of, knowledge and information. 
 Indicative of this far-reaching trend is, in Baert’s view, the rise of ‘dia- 
logical public intellectuals’462. One of their defining features is that they 
‘do not assume a superior stance towards their publics’463 and that, 
instead, they ‘engage with their publics in a more interactive fashion’464 
and on a more horizontal basis. Under such parameters, based on criti- 
cal dialogue and horizontal reciprocity, it becomes possible to establish 
‘an intellectual and social partnership between the sociological research- 
ers and the communities they serve, whereby both parties are willing      
to learn from each other and collaborate, while striving for a common 
political goal’465. 
Although Baert’s diagnosis of the relationship between experts and 
laypersons is largely accurate, it tends to overlook the importance of a 
curious paradox of the contemporary age, which can be described as fol- 
lows: 
 
– On the one hand, the epistemic gap between experts and layper- 
sons has been narrowing due to  the  gradual  universalization  of  
the production, distribution, and consumption of knowledge and 
information. 
– On the other hand, the epistemic gap between experts and lay- 
persons has been widening due to  the  gradual  specialization  of  
the production, distribution, and consumption of knowledge and 
information. 
 
Baert provides a perceptive account of the former tendency, but he  
offers little in the way of an in-depth, let alone a critical, engagement  
with the latter development. In a society in which knowledge—above   
all, scientific knowledge—is increasingly specialized and, on many lev- 
els, even hyper-specialized—that is, divided and sub-divided into dis- 
ciplines, sub-disciplines, and niche areas—it seems untenable to focus 
almost exclusively on the universalizing and democratizing trends in 
relation to the production, distribution, and consumption of epistemic 
resources.  The   simultaneous   universalization   and   particularization   
of knowledge generation in advanced societies are two sides of the same 
coin.466 As such, both processes need to be empirically studied, concep- 
tually grasped, and analytically assessed. Otherwise, we risk telling only 
one part of the story. 
 In addition, one may object the following: 
 
1. The gap between experts and laypersons remains, since human 
agents, in stratified societies, are equipped with unequally distrib- 
uted material and symbolic resources, which manifest themselves  
in asymmetrically allocated forms of capital (notably, in relation   
to social, economic, cultural, educational, linguistic, political, and 
symbolic capital). 
2. The gap between experts and laypersons remains, since human 
agents, in stratified societies, are equipped with specialized epistemic 
resources, which manifest themselves in asymmetrically allocated 
forms of knowledge (which is increasingly divided and sub-divided 
into disciplines, sub-disciplines, and niche areas). 
3. The gap between experts and laypersons remains, since human 
agents, in stratified societies, are equipped with context-dependent 
conceptual and methodological resources, which manifest themselves 
in the functional division between science and common sense (and, 
correspondingly, in the separation between the systematic study of 
reality and the quotidian immersion in reality). 
 
Furthermore, one may wonder to what extent the idea of a partnership 
between researchers and grassroots communities, prepared to learn from 
one another and ‘striving for a common political goal’467, can be consid- 
ered a guarantee of the realization of a project that is not only practi- 
cally viable but also normatively defensible and desirable. For instance, 
authoritarian and fascist movements typically claim to bridge the divide 
between ‘the elite’ and ‘the people’.468 An obvious historical example of 
this ideological rhetoric is Nazi Germany, in which the adjective völkisch 
was commonly used to give the impression of a ‘democratized’ (that is, 
Volk-based) usage of scientific forms of knowledge production.469 One 
may find far less extreme examples to illustrate the following point: the 
fact that both researchers ‘from above’ and laypersons ‘from below’ are 
involved in dialogical exchanges of knowledge is not a guarantee of the 
normative defensibility, let alone desirability, of their goals.470 
Finally, the idea of a partnership between researchers and grass-  
roots communities sounds, of course, appealing in theory. It is far from 
obvious, however, what it actually  means  in  practice  and  how  it  can 
be converted into feasible modes of organizing spheres of knowledge
 production, which can claim to shape constitutive realms of society in a 
more democratic—that is, universally empowering and, hence, emancipa- 
tory—fashion.471 
Thus, one of the principal civilizational challenges  of  the  twenty-  
first century consists in drawing upon the respective strengths, while 
avoiding the respective pitfalls, of (1) authoritative, (2) expert, and (3) 
dialogical public intellectuals. Highly differentiated societies need intel- 
lectuals who are capable of being authoritative without being dogmatic, 
specialized without being disconnected, and dialogical without being 
condescending. Rather than relying on the stifling mechanisms of self- 
referential empires of epistemic power, democratically organized social 
formations need to make use of the powerful, yet fallible, conceptual 
resources provided by authoritative, knowledgeable, and dialogical 
intellectuals. 
 
 
XXV. Effectology 
 
Baert’s plea for a  paradigm  shift  from  a  concern  with  ‘intentions’  to  
an emphasis on ‘effects’ lies at the heart of his entire treatise. The for-  
mer may be associated with a—philosophically inspired—deontological 
approach to the study of the rationale behind intellectual ideas. The  
latter is embedded in a—sociologically motivated—pragmatist frame- 
work, designed to scrutinize the impact of intellectual ideas, notably on 
behavioural, ideological, and institutional developments. The theoreti- 
cal underpinnings of this paradigm shift have been elucidated, in some 
detail, in the previous sections. Rather than repeating the principal 
dimensions of Baert’s plea for a paradigm shift at this stage, let us—for 
the sake of brevity—focus on some problematic aspects of his central 
claim that ‘the solution lies in abandoning a vocabulary of intentions for   
a vocabulary of effects’472. 
Baert asserts that  it  is  common—particularly  in  the  writings  of  
the   Cambridge   School   of   Intellectual   History473,    epitomized    in 
the conceptual framework proposed  by  John  G.  A.  Pocock  and  
Quentin Skinner474—‘to take the meaning of an intellectual  interven-  
tion within a given context to be synonymous with the  intent  behind 
it’475. Challenging this view, Baert advises  ‘to  hold  onto  the  distinc-  
tion between the purpose behind an intellectual intervention and its 
effect’476. The validity of this proposition, however, suffers from a num- 
ber of problems: 
 1. There is the problem of conceptual confusion. At first sight, it 
appears that Baert distinguishes two key levels of analysis; as a 
closer look at the previous statement reveals, however, he actually 
refers to three levels of analysis: 
a. the purpose(s) behind an intellectual intervention, 
b. the meaning(s) of an intellectual intervention, and 
c. the effect(s) of an intellectual intervention. 
Baert focuses on the alleged opposition between (a) and (c). We 
need to recognize, however, that (a), (c), and (b) constitute essen- 
tial dimensions of intellectual realities. 
a. The purpose (or purposes) behind an intellectual intervention 
describes (or describe) the intention (or intentions) that an 
intellectual has when making an assertion. This intention (or 
these intentions) can express a concern with objective, norma- 
tive, or subjective aspects of human existence (or with a combi- 
nation of these elements). 
b. The meaning (or meanings) of an intellectual intervention des- 
ignates (or designate) the interpretation (or interpretations) 
made in relation to it, both by its author him- or herself and by 
its recipients. This meaning (or these meanings) can articulate  
a concern with the objective, normative, or subjective dimen- 
sions of the intervention (by focusing on one, two, or all three 
of these elements). 
c. The effect (or effects) of an intellectual intervention refers (or 
refer) to its material or symbolic impact upon the intellectual 
field and/or other social fields. This impact can be assessed—if 
not measured—in objective, normative, or subjective terms (or 
in terms of a combination of these elements). 
The conceptual differentiation between these three levels of analy- 
sis would have contributed to the terminological precision, meth- 
odological rigour, and empirical usefulness of Baert’s—otherwise 
formidable—account of intellectuals. 
2. There is the problem of analytical limitation. Baert’s effect-centred 
approach runs the risk of understating the importance of intentions 
behind, and meanings attached to, intellectuals’ interventions. To be 
sure, these intentions and meanings can be classified in different ways: 
• in constitutive terms, they can be conscious or unconscious, explicit or 
implicit, blatant or subtle, obvious or hidden, basic or sophisticated; 
 • in evaluative terms, they can be selfish or altruistic, right-wing    
or left-wing, conservative or progressive, complicit or subversive, 
orthodox or heterodox, traditional or cutting-edge. 
It is possible to develop a comprehensive typology of intentions, 
permitting researchers to identify and—if desired—to assess the 
rationale behind specific intellectual interventions. The aim of 
such a typological endeavour is not to negate the socio-ontologi- 
cal significance of the effects that intellectual interventions may, or 
may not, have. Notwithstanding the merits of such an undertak- 
ing, it draws attention to a crucial insight: the pragmatist ambi- 
tion to prove the socio-ontological preponderance of effects involves 
the danger of losing sight of the socio-ontological significance of the 
intentions behind, and meanings attributed to, intellectual inter- 
ventions. All three dimensions—that is, (a) purposes/intentions, 
(b) meanings/interpretations, and (c) effects/consequences— 
need to be taken into consideration, without asserting their respec- 
tive socio-ontological preponderance in an a priori fashion. Where 
there are human actions, interactions, and interventions, there are 
intentions, meanings, and effects. All three levels of analysis deserve 
to  be  studied  and  to  be  given  substantial  diagnostic  weight.  
If one of them is attributed more interpretive, or even explana- 
tory, value than the others, then we end up providing a reductive 
account of social life in general and of intellectual life in particular. 
Intellectual interventions have effects because of, not despite, the 
fact that they are both intention-laden and meaning-laden. 
 
*** *** *** 
Regardless of their critical content, the purpose of the above reflections  
is to be constructive. As such, they should not draw attention away from 
the fact that Baert’s The Existentialist Moment: The Rise of Sartre as a 
Public Intellectual has broken new ground and opened hitherto barely 
explored avenues for the study of intellectuals. The theoretical frame- 
work upon which Baert’s inquiry is based is highly original, making a 
much-needed contribution to contemporary sociological thought. Baert 
deserves to be applauded for having taken our socio-historical under- 
standing of the intellectual field to an unparalleled level. The challenge 
that remains when grappling with the role of intellectuals in society477, 
however, is to push the debate forward by examining the impact of
 recent and ongoing global developments on the sociological variables 
underlying the production of symbolic forms in general and of critical 
discourses in particular. This task is all the more pressing in light of the 
rapidly changing conditions of civilizational existence in the twenty-first 
century. One can only hope that intellectuals will play a largely positive 
role in shaping the development of society—that is, a role in which their 
particular interests, which they pursue when contributing to the power- 
laden construction of field-specific realities, are subordinated to the uni- 
versal interests of humanity. 
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